Are gay rights, including gay marriage, evolving?

01/07/2010 01:14:17 PM · #3901

Originally posted by chaimelle:

Originally posted by Louis:

Originally posted by chaimelle:
Why are we (the US) trying to be the world police? Is it really any of our business if African nations declare homosexuality wrong? Would we want Russia or China telling us what our laws and/or values should be?

Did you think it was wrong when virtually every country in the world, the US included, spoke out against apartheid?

I'm torn on this. I don't have a problem with stating that we believe something is wrong (apartheid, child labor in China) but how far should we go in trying to bring about a change? Again, I ask, would we have wanted Russia telling us to end discrimination during the 1950's and 60's?

Russia explicitly made those very arguments regarding racial and sexual discrimination during those periods and through the 1970s. And it was correct. It also harshly critiqued the U.S. in regard to the American failure to care for its poor. However, all of these arguments were probably made very cynically by the USSR for political purposes.

The critique of the US's discriminatory political and social structures was actually quite devastating on the world stage and here in America, particularly during the war in Vietnam. The problem for the USSR, especially in the later decades, was not that its critiques of the US were unpersuasive, but rather that the immorality of its own political and social structure became increasingly apparent. Yes, the US's treatment of minorities and women was immoral, but the USSR's solution was an even more immoral equality of oppression for all. Yes, the US's economic system required and generated a class of clear economic losers, but the USSR's system was hopelessly flawed and resulted in widespread and crushing poverty for a majority of its citizens, despite the grand state rhetoric.

01/07/2010 01:27:32 PM · #3902

Originally posted by DrAchoo:

My question to you (or to a relativist if you aren't one), is this: Do you think a society (or an individual) has the authoritative right to declare that torture is, in fact, a moral choice which is available to them? And if they do decide this, should that new system (as bizarre as it sounds to you or I) be considered as legitimate as our own which frowns on such an act? Note I'm not asking whether societies or individuals ever participate in torture (because the answer there is obviously yes), but can they do so with as much moral legitimacy as someone who does not?

While it might be theoretically possible to imagine a society that accepts torture as a moral choice - that is, a society where there is unanimous consent to the act of torture, even by those who will or may be subjected to such torture - it seems unlikely that such consensus would ever be freely given. The threat of torture is a powerful attack on personal agency, which is why it is so often adopted by oppressive regimes. Of course, no society can make a moral decision to subject individuals standing outside of the society to torture, since by definition they will have in no way contributed to the moral consensus.

01/07/2010 01:29:53 PM · #3903

Holy crap SP, a thought-out argument avoiding hyperbole and emotional outburst. What the heck am I supposed to do with that?

Give me maybe till lunch to chew on in. I'll get back to you.

01/07/2010 01:37:53 PM · #3904

Originally posted by DrAchoo:

Holy crap SP, a thought-out argument avoiding hyperbole and emotional outburst. What the heck am I supposed to do with that?

Oh, I can do hysterics and hyperbole, but right tool for the job at hand, as they say.

;)

01/07/2010 02:49:09 PM · #3905

Ok, strap in, weâ��re going for a ride.

I always chafe at the artificial way conversations occur in written form. Iâ��ll do some nesting as necessary, but mainly try to avoid it.

Your (Shutterpuppyâ��s) first paragraph which summarized my position is pretty accurate and I donâ��t have any real objections. I agree that in general I personally appeal to God as the source for the objective morality (although I will often try to do without because I know not everybody accepts God as being real), but I will affirm that Universalists do not necessarily need to appeal to God. Other examples of objective sources would be rational thought (a reasonable person should be able to rationally think their way to a conclusion) or genetic imperative (our genes offer an objective source for defining right action).

To expound just a bit on the differences I see between moral relativism and moral universalism (also referred to as moral objectivism) I am going to quote the Standford Encyclopedia of Philosophyâ��s article on moral relativism. It actually speaks to both and may clearly illustrate what I see as the main, crucial difference between the two meta-ethics. (the bolding is mine)

________________________
Moral objectivists â�¦ main claim is that ordinarily there is a rational basis for overcoming disagreements (not that people would actually come to agree). Objectivists maintain that, typically, at least one party in a moral disagreement accepts the moral judgment on account of some factual or logical mistake, and that revealing such mistakes would be sufficient to rationally resolve the disagreement. They suggest that whatever genuine moral disagreements there are usually can be resolved in this fashion. In addition, objectivists sometimes offer an analysis of why people make such mistakes. For example, people may be influenced by passion, prejudice, ideology, self-interest, and the like. In general, objectivists think, insofar as people set these influences aside, and are reasonable and well-informed, there is generally a basis for resolving their moral differences. (They might also say that at least some agreements about moral truths reflect the fact that, with respect to matters pertaining to these truths, people generally have been reasonable and well-informed.)
Proponents of MMR (meta-ethical moral relativism) may allow that moral disagreements sometimes are rationally resolved. In particular, they may grant that this often happens when the parties to a moral dispute share a moral framework. The characteristic relativist contention is that a common moral framework is often lacking, especially in moral disagreements between one society and another, and that differences in moral frameworks usually cannot be explained simply by supposing that one society or the other is making factual or logical mistakes. These moral disagreements are ultimately rooted in fundamentally different moral orientations, and there is usually no reason to think these differences result from the fact that, in relevant respects, one side is less reasonable or well-informed than the other. This conclusion might rest on the observation that it is not evident that mistakes are at the root of these disagreement. But it might also depend on a theory, developed to explain such observations, that the frameworks are incommensurable: They do not have enough in common, in terms of either shared concepts or shared standards, to resolve their differences, and there is no impartial third standpoint, accessible to any reasonable and well-informed person, that could be invoked to resolve the conflict.
_______________________________________

Perhaps my main argument, then, is that although many people claim to be moral relativists like yourself and others on this thread, few practice the logical conclusions found above, that is, few accept that there are no rational arguments to be made to convince the other party of their error (or accept that the other party is not in â��errorâ�� to begin with). Look at this thread. Itâ��s 3500 posts of people trying to rationally (well, at times) explain why gay marriage should be accepted or not accepted. That sounds like people feel the first bolded statement above is more correct than the second one. Perhaps the best way to proceed is for us all to admit we are objectivists and then work at rationally solving the problem.
So as I move to your hypothetical ethical standard, I would argue that it is actually categorized as a universal meta-ethic rather than a relative one. It would hold that a moral disagreement between two parties could be solved by the rational application of â��Maximization of autonomous participation by moral agentsâ��. True to your definition of universalism, this ethic is only persuasive if 1) itâ��s true and, more importantly, 2) the person/society toward which the request for change is directed shares or accepts the rationality of the â��maximization of autonomous participation by moral agentsâ��. To further emphasize the universal nature of the ethic, I would point out to the similarity in language with Utilitarianism which is also considered as falling into the meta-ethical category of universalism.
So, in conclusion, although you claim to be a â��true relativistâ��, I think your language belies your position. You bring up an ethic that fits with objectivism and also use language like â��basic moral normsâ�� or â��biologically based, moral instinctsâ��. Both those terms make far more sense in a framework of moral objectivism than one of moral rationalism. Clearly they do not rely on God as the source (and perhaps that is your hidden objection), but they rely on rationality and genetics respectively.

01/07/2010 03:13:09 PM · #3906

Originally posted by DrAchoo:

Your (Shutterpuppyâ��s) first paragraph which summarized my position is pretty accurate and I donâ��t have any real objections. I agree that in general I personally appeal to God as the source for the objective morality (although I will often try to do without because I know not everybody accepts God as being real), but I will affirm that Universalists do not necessarily need to appeal to God. Other examples of objective sources would be rational thought (a reasonable person should be able to rationally think their way to a conclusion) or genetic imperative (our genes offer an objective source for defining right action).

. . .

Perhaps my main argument, then, is that although many people claim to be moral relativists like yourself and others on this thread, few practice the logical conclusions found above, that is, few accept that there are no rational arguments to be made to convince the other party of their error (or accept that the other party is not in â��errorâ�� to begin with).

. . .

So, in conclusion, although you claim to be a â��true relativistâ��, I think your language belies your position. You bring up an ethic that fits with objectivism and also use language like â��basic moral normsâ�� or â��biologically based, moral instinctsâ��.

Just a quick shot back for now, because I have to get back to work, but I think we are getting at what - I believe - is a key distinction/definition.

Here is the point that I think truly separates the relativist from the objectivist: In a society of one, with no interactions outside of the society, is there such a thing as morality? As a relativist, my answer is a clear no. I believe that the "true objectivist" will be compelled to answer yes.

Leica 35mm f/1.4 Summilux M Aspherical MF - Black

01/07/2010 04:00:13 PM · #3907

Originally posted by shutterpuppy:

Here is the point that I think truly separates the relativist from the objectivist: In a society of one, with no interactions outside of the society, is there such a thing as morality? As a relativist, my answer is a clear no. I believe that the "true objectivist" will be compelled to answer yes.

What about looking at it this way? Does morality exist in a society of one? The answer may be "yes, but it is irrelevant." 99% of moral questions or precepts involve the interaction between two individuals. If there is only one, then the answer isn't "yes" or "no", but rather "N/A". I do feel morality does still exist. God could still exist (and be the source for the N/A morality). Rationality certainly still exists (I could posit the hypothetical existance of another individual and the rational conclusions to my interactions with him). Genetics still exist (which might still have biological imperatives were I to suddenly find myself interacting with another). So the objective idea of the morality still exists, but the situations where they would need application would not.

In a universe with nothing in it, does 2+2 still equal 4?

scarbrd

Leica M10

01/07/2010 04:14:02 PM · #3908

Originally posted by DrAchoo:

Originally posted by shutterpuppy:
Here is the point that I think truly separates the relativist from the objectivist: In a society of one, with no interactions outside of the society, is there such a thing as morality? As a relativist, my answer is a clear no. I believe that the "true objectivist" will be compelled to answer yes.

What about looking at it this way? Does morality exist in a society of one? The answer may be "yes, but it is irrelevant." 99% of moral questions or precepts involve the interaction between two individuals. If there is only one, then the answer isn't "yes" or "no", but rather "N/A". I do feel morality does still exist. God could still exist (and be the source for the N/A morality). Rationality certainly still exists (I could posit the hypothetical existance of another individual and the rational conclusions to my interactions with him). Genetics still exist (which might still have biological imperatives were I to suddenly find myself interacting with another). So the objective idea of the morality still exists, but the situations where they would need application would not.

In a universe with nothing in it, does 2+2 still equal 4?

yes, physics existed even before we "discovered" them. Unless you want to get into the whole Orwellian idea that if it better serves the state, then 2+2=5

Also, you can't have a society of one person. Society implies relationships between multiple individuals. So, your N/A classification is actually applicable.

Message edited by author 2010-01-07 16:14:32.

yanko

Canon EOS-5D Mark II

Carl Zeiss 50mm ZE f/1.4 Planar T for Canon

01/07/2010 04:19:29 PM · #3909

Originally posted by DrAchoo:

In a universe with nothing in it, does 2+2 still equal 4?

But since people do exist and have proven that 2+2 does equal 4 it's considered to be true without question. That would probably fit your notion of a universal truth. It remains constant and nobody disputes the claim. This is in stark contrast to your universal truth regarding torture. It shares none of those attributes.

01/07/2010 04:39:02 PM · #3910

Originally posted by DrAchoo:

Setting aside arguments that arise from pedantic mathematicians, 2+2 always equals 4 (at least in our universe), because the expression is a description of a state of physical reality that exists external to our perception of that reality.

Second, I am going to have to call you out and summarily reject your attempt to rope in "rationality" as an external source for moral judgments. Reason and rationality are internal sources of moral judgments - judgments between individuals may differ, but be entirely rational from the individual's perspective. It is not, in itself, a source of external moral authority.

Third, it is hard not to take your response as the sort of backpedalling that you accused others of earlier - even though you do eventually come round to admitting that your answer is yes to the hypothetical. By your own definitions, external, objective morality either exists or it doesn't - regardless of the number of potential moral actors involved. Whether moral decisions "matter" or not because of the possibility or impossibility of those decisions' affect on other moral actors, should indeed be irrelevant for the objectivist, but also not the point.

For the relativist, it is the potential for affect on other moral actors that gives rise to the very existence of morality. In the "society" of one, all is permitted and nothing is required.

Would it be immoral for the last living moral entity on Earth to blow up the planet if the entity had the power to do so? No. You or I might disagree with such action, might not make the same decision given the same situation, but such action cannot be said to be "immoral" for the very fact that it holds no potential to interfere with the moral agency of any other moral entity. (I am using "moral agent/entity" rather than "person" specifically, because one issue for the relativist is who/what should be included within the definition of "moral agent/entity") Where there is consensus, it could also not be said to be immoral for 2, 10, 100 or n number moral entities to blow up the planet, if the decision to do so was authentically unanimous. Again, you and I can disagree with a decision, even feel revulsion at the idea of a particular decision, but cannot rationally describe it as "immoral" where there is true consensus among all effected moral agents.

The problem for the relativist, as I have stated in the past, is how to distinguish "moral" action when there is no practical possibility of achieving true consensus among all moral agents.

Message edited by author 2010-01-07 16:42:31.

01/07/2010 04:51:27 PM · #3911

Originally posted by shutterpuppy:

Second, I am going to have to call you out and summarily reject your attempt to rope in "rationality" as an external source for moral judgments. Reason and rationality are internal sources of moral judgments - judgments between individuals may differ, but be entirely rational from the individual's perspective. It is not, in itself, a source of external moral authority.

Well, in an argument where definitions are at issue, I think one can usually appeal to authoritative sources. I quoted the Standford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. As plus/minus as we can be about wiki, it also backs up the idea with "The source or justification of a universal ethic may be thought to be, for instance, human nature, shared vulnerability to suffering, the demands of universal reason, what is common among existing moral codes, or the common mandates of religion..."

I suppose it is within your right to "summarily reject" this, but I'm not sure what grounds you are currently doing it on other than your own authority. Would that stand up in court? I'm open to quotes found in impartial, authoritative sources though.

Canon 12x IS USM (S3 IS built-in Lens) -- 36-432mm (35mm EQ)

01/07/2010 05:00:25 PM · #3912

I think actually I have a better response. I think you are now having a discussion about moral realism and not moral objectivity. Moral objectivity is a meta-ethic that describes a ethical system. If there are no ethical systems to describe then moral objectivity ceases to mean something. Moral realism deals with the very scenario you bring up. If people didn't exist (or only one person exists), does morality still exist? The two concepts are quite different and I don't think you can conclude that moral objectivity does not work because you deny moral realism. In the same breath you would also have to discard moral relativism because there would be no ethical codes for that meta-ethic to describe as well.

If you are a true relativist, let me ask you if moral relativity exists in your society of one? If you answer yes, my question is "relative to what"? If you answer is no, how are you in any different boat than me?

Message edited by author 2010-01-07 17:04:51.

GeneralE

Canon PowerShot S3 IS

01/07/2010 05:28:33 PM · #3913

Originally posted by shutterpuppy:

Setting aside arguments that arise from pedantic mathematicians, 2+2 always equals 4 ...

Only in Base-5 and above ... ;-)

Originally posted by DrAchoo:

I'm open to quotes found in impartial, authoritative sources though.

"So convenient a thing it is to be a reasonable creature, since it enables one to find or make a reason for everything one has a mind to do."
-- Benjamin Franklin (1706 - 1790)

Message edited by author 2010-01-07 17:39:40.

Elaine

Canon EOS R5

Canon EF 24-105mm f/4.0L IS II USM Lens

01/07/2010 05:37:46 PM · #3914

I would expect most people who believe the teachings of a religion to also believe in a universal truth.

01/07/2010 06:12:40 PM · #3915

Originally posted by DrAchoo:

Okay, this is good. We seem to be getting closer to an understanding of each other's base argument. (And getting an education in how academic philosophers talk about concepts versus non-academics.) I would answer no to your ending question, "moral relativity" does not exist in my hypothetical - the actions of the agent in the "society of one" cannot be immoral, but neither can they be rationally described as moral. So I suppose that yes, what I am really denying is what you have termed moral realism. I describe myself as a relativist because I reject the idea that morality is derived from some outside, external source - and I guess I would argue with the characterization of many of the supposed "sources for justification of a universal ethic" as being truly "external." I think it is clear that I do believe that there are at least some minimal objective moral standards for humans in society, so perhaps we are arguing at cross purposes.

I feel like I need to read through the Stanford article (Stanford - Moral Relativism) to respond to you more fully, but it is quite a beast so there may be a bit of a delay. I will note that I found myself nodding along at this, taken from the first paragraph of the section titled "Mixed Positions: A Rapprochement between Relativists and Objectivists?"

Originally posted by From the Ivory Tower:

Discussions of moral relativism often assume (as generally has been assumed here so far) that moral relativism is the correct account of all moral judgments or of none. But it is possible that it is the correct account of some moral judgments but not others or, more vaguely, that the best account of morality vis-a-vis these issues would acknowledge both relativist and objectivist elements. Such a mixed position might be motivated by some of the questions already raised. On the empirical level, it might be thought that there are many substantial moral disagreements but also some striking moral agreements across different societies. On the metaethical plane, it might be supposed that, though many disagreements are not likely to be rationally resolved, other disagreements may be (and perhaps that the cross-cultural agreements we find have a rational basis).

Message edited by author 2010-01-07 18:22:16.

01/07/2010 06:57:22 PM · #3916

I agree with you and think we ARE getting somewhere. Let me think out loud a bit about the hybrid system. Perhaps the reality is this. Universal truths of morality do exist. That is, most people would agree with general statements like "Liberty is good." "Coercion is bad." However, where societies (or individuals) differ is the prioritization of the agreed upon statements. Rarely do moral disagreements come up about straightforward situations. More commonly the situation is a conflict which requires the prioritizing of one or more commonly agreed upon moral precepts. Problems arise because different conclusions are reached when different moral precepts are given priority.

Message edited by author 2010-01-07 19:00:31.

01/07/2010 08:18:23 PM · #3917

Originally posted by DrAchoo:

Perhaps the reality is this. Universal truths of morality do exist. That is, most people would agree with general statements like "Liberty is good." "Coercion is bad."

I would posit the reverse: that morality is relative, but where enough people agree on common standards, they can hold their shared opinion to be universal (at least amongst themselves). The Universal Declaration of Human Rights and U.S. Constitution are good examples. However, the notion that all people share these basic values is still an illusion of perception.

Your comment here, for example:

Originally posted by DrAchoo:

I will say it chills me that we could be having a discussion which calls into question whether torture or rape is really wrong (or what it is).

Most of the participants in these threads would agree that torture and rape are wrong, but our near-unanimity is only valid amongst ourselves. If there were really a universal standard, then "corrective" rapes in Uganda would be taboo even there, and you wouldn't find people confidently proclaiming in DPC threads that torture is sometimes justified. Heck, both were widely promoted throughout the Old Testament!

01/07/2010 09:31:34 PM · #3918

Originally posted by scalvert:

Originally posted by DrAchoo:
Perhaps the reality is this. Universal truths of morality do exist. That is, most people would agree with general statements like "Liberty is good." "Coercion is bad."

I would posit the reverse: that morality is relative, but where enough people agree on common standards, they can hold their shared opinion to be universal (at least amongst themselves). The Universal Declaration of Human Rights and U.S. Constitution are good examples. However, the notion that all people share these basic values is still an illusion of perception.

Your comment here, for example:
Originally posted by DrAchoo:
I will say it chills me that we could be having a discussion which calls into question whether torture or rape is really wrong (or what it is).

Most of the participants in these threads would agree that torture and rape are wrong, but our near-unanimity is only valid amongst ourselves. If there were really a universal standard, then "corrective" rapes in Uganda would be taboo even there, and you wouldn't find people confidently proclaiming in DPC threads that torture is sometimes justified. Heck, both were widely promoted throughout the Old Testament!

I would counter that it is not necessary to consider an ideal to be universal only if all people adhere to it (despite the name). There will always be outliers or people who are incapable of making moral decisions. The question about the "corrective" rapes (I'm unfamiliar with this, have we brought it up before?) is, can we rationally show these people the error of their thinking or do we consider ourselves to be without the rational tools to communicate with such a foreign society? (I'm speaking to the bolded sentences out of the philosophical encyclopedia I quoted above). I would contend that we should be able to rationally show the Ugandans that "corrective rapes" are wrong. Which do you identify with?

EDIT: I'll recap the bolded quotes I mentioned:

Objectivists maintain that, typically, at least one party in a moral disagreement accepts the moral judgment on account of some factual or logical mistake, and that revealing such mistakes would be sufficient to rationally resolve the disagreement.

The characteristic relativist contention is that a common moral framework is often lacking, especially in moral disagreements between one society and another, and that differences in moral frameworks usually cannot be explained simply by supposing that one society or the other is making factual or logical mistakes. These moral disagreements are ultimately rooted in fundamentally different moral orientations, and there is usually no reason to think these differences result from the fact that, in relevant respects, one side is less reasonable or well-informed than the other.

Message edited by author 2010-01-07 21:34:18.

01/07/2010 10:27:57 PM · #3919

Originally posted by DrAchoo:

The question about the "corrective" rapes (I'm unfamiliar with this, have we brought it up before?) is, can we rationally show these people the error of their thinking or do we consider ourselves to be without the rational tools to communicate with such a foreign society? (I'm speaking to the bolded sentences out of the philosophical encyclopedia I quoted above). I would contend that we should be able to rationally show the Ugandans that "corrective rapes" are wrong. Which do you identify with?

The "corrective rapes" were mentioned in the earlier articles as one of the tools Ugandans are using to "cure" homosexuality. Thus, they are already rationalizing that it's right, and there's the rub: ANY moral position can be rationalized. You seem to be confusing rationalization with truth. The difference between relative and universal is not in whether a given stance can be rationalized, but whether one side is objectively correct... and no universal standard exists to form the basis of that proof. Sure, humans almost certainly share a common sense of decency, but not an objective standard or definition of it. ALL written standards are the result of consensus between members of one or more groups (what they believe should be) and not universally authoritative. So, while one might point to the Geneva Convention, Bible or Constitution as a benchmark of acceptability, if the other party is not a signatory, believer or citizen, then it's no better than mere opinion.

01/07/2010 11:17:59 PM · #3920

Originally posted by scalvert:

Originally posted by DrAchoo:
The question about the "corrective" rapes (I'm unfamiliar with this, have we brought it up before?) is, can we rationally show these people the error of their thinking or do we consider ourselves to be without the rational tools to communicate with such a foreign society? (I'm speaking to the bolded sentences out of the philosophical encyclopedia I quoted above). I would contend that we should be able to rationally show the Ugandans that "corrective rapes" are wrong. Which do you identify with?

The "corrective rapes" were mentioned in the earlier articles as one of the tools Ugandans are using to "cure" homosexuality. Thus, they are already rationalizing that it's right, and there's the rub: ANY moral position can be rationalized. You seem to be confusing rationalization with truth. The difference between relative and universal is not in whether a given stance can be rationalized, but whether one side is objectively correct... and no universal standard exists to form the basis of that proof. Sure, humans almost certainly share a common sense of decency, but not an objective standard or definition of it. ALL written standards are the result of consensus between members of one or more groups (what they believe should be) and not universally authoritative. So, while one might point to the Geneva Convention, Bible or Constitution as a benchmark of acceptability, if the other party is not a signatory, believer or citizen, then it's no better than mere opinion.

Then we are all lost.

I will point out that even the fact that the actions are "rationalized" belies the fact they know, at root, they are wrong. In other words, they need justification. We only need justification for immoral actions, we never need justification for moral ones. I don't go serve down at the soup kitchen and then justify why I did it. If, on the other hand, I steal something, I may try to justify my action as necessary.

01/07/2010 11:39:34 PM · #3921

Originally posted by DrAchoo:

We only need justification for immoral actions, we never need justification for moral ones.

Oooh... I don't think you want to go down that road.

Justify: 1. show or prove to be right or reasonable 2. declare or make righteous in the sight of God.

Something is not inherently right or wrong just because we rationalize or justify it (you've certainly attempted to justify discrimination against homosexuals).

Message edited by author 2010-01-07 23:40:16.

Pentax D-FA* 70-200mm f/2.8 ED DC AW

01/07/2010 11:43:07 PM · #3922

In addition, objectivists sometimes offer an analysis of why people make such mistakes. For example, people may be influenced by passion, prejudice, ideology, self-interest, and the like. In general, objectivists think, insofar as people set these influences aside, and are reasonable and well-informed, there is generally a basis for resolving their moral differences.

I agree that an attempt at justification doesn't make something right or wrong, but it betrays our own feelings about the event. We don't try to justify actions we view as good and we do try to justify actions we view as bad.

You can be a relativist. That's your option. But don't let me catch you acting like an Objectivist, cuz there will be trouble mister!

Message edited by author 2010-01-07 23:44:36.

K3Master

Pentax K-3

01/07/2010 11:45:16 PM · #3923

Originally posted by DrAchoo:

Tell me, do you dream of electric sheep?