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03/28/2011 03:40:24 PM · #851 |
Originally posted by scalvert:
1. morality itself is a fictional construct of society, a convention of cultural agreement that says something is right or wrong.
2. we arrive at that moral conclusion when our underlying reasons lead to common beliefs.
3. those underlying reasons may or may not be true or shared by all, and there may be objective ways to assess whether those reasons are true and the rationale sound.
Is this what you're going for? If so, then we still agree. |
This much closer to what I'm saying, but I must pedantically pull back against your use of the word "fictional" in #1 and continue to distance myself from your apparent sense that "moral conclusions" can only mean "convention[s]" arrived at by "cultural agreement." At least, to the extent you are using the word "fictional" to mean "arbitrary."
I realize that at one level I am splitting some pretty fine hairs here - and I acknowledge that, in practice at least, there may be little difference between our approaches - but I think the distinction I want to make is an important one.
The underlying thrust of my argument is that there may be non-arbitrary, inherent (aka, non-"fictional") qualities to being human that can provide an objective basis for moral judgment and critique. That is, there may be certain inherent qualities to being "human" that logically and objectively (i.e., non-arbitrarily) require certain moral conclusions.
To go back to the chess example:
Even though the rules of the game of chess provide an internal, objective measure to evaluating who wins and who loses, there is nothing inherent about the pieces, the board or the game itself that requires that the rules be the way they are, or any certain way in particular. Thus, it would be entirely true to say that chess is internally objective, but is an entirely "fictional" construct from an external perspective. Theoretically, any arbitrary set of rules could be adopted and labeled "chess," its a completely made up game which relies upon social agreement for its existence.
On the other hand, if there are certain inherent qualities to being human, and those human qualities have moral implications, then human morality - at least for the set of behaviors relating to the inherent quality at issue - is not arbitrary and/or "fictional." In such a case the "moral ideal" for the set of relevant behaviors will be an objective truth - dependent upon the parameters of the internal system (the inherent quality(ies) of being human) but also externally objectively identifiable (that is, an outside observer could say - given that the fact of being human means X, in order to be a moral human must mean Y).
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03/28/2011 04:03:37 PM · #852 |
Originally posted by shutterpuppy:
On the other hand, if there are certain inherent qualities to being human, and those human qualities have moral implications, then human morality - at least for the set of behaviors relating to the inherent quality at issue - is not arbitrary and/or "fictional." In such a case the "moral ideal" for the set of relevant behaviors will be an objective truth - dependent upon the parameters of the internal system (the inherent quality(ies) of being human) but also externally objectively identifiable (that is, an outside observer could say - given that the fact of being human means X, in order to be a moral human must mean Y). |
Can you give an example to show us where you're headed here? Can you show us an "inherent quality to being human" that has a "moral implication"?
R. |
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03/28/2011 04:38:01 PM · #853 |
Originally posted by shutterpuppy:
The underlying thrust of my argument is that there may be non-arbitrary, inherent (aka, non-"fictional") qualities to being human that can provide an objective basis for moral judgment and critique. That is, there may be certain inherent qualities to being "human" that logically and objectively (i.e., non-arbitrarily) require certain moral conclusions.. |
I think there is a big sticking point in the question of objectivity in morality, and the acceptance that they are a construct of society rather than a natural outcome of a higher power or an inherent part of being human.
As rational thinkers we prize the provable, and distrust inference; however to my mind the inferred is all we have to work with. From Plato's allegory of the cave, through Heisenberg uncertainty principle and Schrödinger's cat, we are limited in our understanding by our ability to sense with our limited senses what is around us, to differentiate what we understand from what is real. If we can not accept the limitations of our perceptions and create workable metaphors or construct that can be used, then we must either work on faith in a creator who sets down laws through divine revelation, or collapse into existential nihilism.
The fact that something is a fiction does not make it any less utile. Time as we understand it may not truly exist from an empirical viewpoint, yet we order our world by it. It is a workable construct, so we use it. Does our moral code need to be any more "real"? |
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03/28/2011 05:01:55 PM · #854 |
Originally posted by shutterpuppy:
This much closer to what I'm saying, but I must pedantically pull back against your use of the word "fictional" in #1 and continue to distance myself from your apparent sense that "moral conclusions" can only mean "convention[s]" arrived at by "cultural agreement." At least, to the extent you are using the word "fictional" to mean "arbitrary." |
Either of the dictionary definitions of "fiction" will suffice, but the latter is probably more applicable here: "invention or fabrication as opposed to fact" or "a belief or statement that is false, but that is often held to be true because it is expedient to do so"
Originally posted by shutterpuppy:
The underlying thrust of my argument is that there may be non-arbitrary, inherent (aka, non-"fictional") qualities to being human that can provide an objective basis for moral judgment and critique. That is, there may be certain inherent qualities to being "human" that logically and objectively (i.e., non-arbitrarily) require certain moral conclusions. |
We agree that there may be objective, rational bases for our opinions, but they remain opinions as any statement of "ought" must be. Consider that given a choice between saving a fellow human or gorilla, our near-universal inclination would be to save the human. However, the gorilla (an outside observer) would most likely choose to save its own kind on the same biological grounds. Which is objectively right? Neither. They are both opinions of rightness from individual or even collective perspectives. That most humans would agree with a conclusion given the same biological imperatives and rationalizations does not make it any less subjective, just widely accepted.
Originally posted by BrennanOB:
The fact that something is a fiction does not make it any less utile. Time as we understand it may not truly exist from an empirical viewpoint, yet we order our world by it. It is a workable construct, so we use it. Does our moral code need to be any more "real"? |
I agree, and that would be moral fictionalism. |
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03/28/2011 08:15:58 PM · #855 |
SP, I'm not looking to drive you into the arms of Shannon since your position is closer to mine than his is, but I have an objection to your rational basis for morality. While I certainly agree with your axiom of personal autonomy, to be effective it seems dependent on another axiom which is the equality of all humans. In other words, you may value personal autonomy, but you may not see certain other individuals as being deserving of the same autonomy for some reason. What is the fundamental rational for understanding the equality of all humans? You know my answer already, but what is the formulation of your own?
Message edited by author 2011-03-28 20:16:16. |
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03/28/2011 08:51:26 PM · #856 |
Originally posted by DrAchoo:
While I certainly agree with your axiom of personal autonomy, to be effective it seems dependent on another axiom which is the equality of all humans. In other words, you may value personal autonomy, but you may not see certain other individuals as being deserving of the same autonomy for some reason. What is the fundamental rational for understanding the equality of all humans? You know my answer already, but what is the formulation of your own? |
You're in the same boat, Jason, and with a far bigger leak. You may see goodness as a divine decree or perhaps comparative measure to divine ideals, but you do not agree with others' concept of god or his wishes. Essentially, you're saying that morality is not subjective belief, but a fact... based on belief! What is the fundamental non-belief rationale for determining the correct (or even existence of) god, much less his specific intent? |
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03/28/2011 08:54:36 PM · #857 |
Originally posted by DrAchoo:
SP, I'm not looking to drive you into the arms of Shannon ... |
...Of course you wouldn't, the good book tells you that this is unnatural... doesn't it? :O)
Ray |
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03/28/2011 08:55:23 PM · #858 |
Originally posted by scalvert:
What is the fundamental non-belief rationale for determining the correct (or even existence of) god, much less his specific intent? |
To answer that question is just to play the game by your rules, which I reject. Why does something have to be based upon a fundamental non-belief rationale to be correct? |
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03/28/2011 08:59:02 PM · #859 |
Originally posted by DrAchoo:
To answer that question is just to play the game by your rules, which I reject. Why does something have to be based upon a fundamental non-belief rationale to be correct? |
Could it be because a belief basis cannot be rationalized?... just asking.
Ray |
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03/28/2011 09:15:11 PM · #860 |
Originally posted by DrAchoo:
Why does something have to be based upon a fundamental non-belief rationale to be correct? |
We both say something is right or wrong because [insert reason(s) X]. We refer to X because we attempt to justify that moral opinion, and the difference between a rational or irrational basis for X is rather important for credibility. If it turns out that you believe X only because you believe, then you're missing a critical turtle at the bottom. ;-) |
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03/28/2011 09:19:54 PM · #861 |
Originally posted by scalvert:
Originally posted by DrAchoo:
Why does something have to be based upon a fundamental non-belief rationale to be correct? |
We both say something is right or wrong because [insert reason(s) X]. We refer to X because we attempt to justify that moral opinion, and the difference between a rational or irrational basis for X is rather important for credibility. If it turns out that you believe X only because you believe, then you're missing a critical turtle at the bottom. ;-) |
Yet, if this is your framework of truth, what validates the framework? If a fundamental non-belief does, then it's a self-referencing system. If it is not, then it is self-invalidating.
Message edited by author 2011-03-28 21:20:24. |
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03/28/2011 09:40:08 PM · #862 |
Originally posted by DrAchoo:
Yet, if this is your framework of truth, what validates the framework? If a fundamental non-belief does, then it's a self-referencing system. If it is not, then it is self-invalidating. |
Remember: from a moral fictionalist perspective, validation is not possible since morality does not exist as an objective truth. One can give rational arguments to support a personal opinion of good or bad, but the opinion cannot be declared "correct" for the same reason you can't prove a meal is delicious or a painting is beautiful. We can SAY something is delicious or beautiful as an expression of fact from a personal point of view, yet these things simply don't exist as independent truths even if everyone on the planet agrees with the assessment.
Message edited by author 2011-03-28 21:40:58. |
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03/28/2011 09:45:51 PM · #863 |
Originally posted by scalvert:
Originally posted by DrAchoo:
Yet, if this is your framework of truth, what validates the framework? If a fundamental non-belief does, then it's a self-referencing system. If it is not, then it is self-invalidating. |
Remember: from a moral fictionalist perspective, validation is not possible since morality does not exist as an objective truth. One can give rational arguments to support a personal opinion of good or bad, but the opinion cannot be declared "correct" for the same reason you can't prove a meal is delicious or a painting is beautiful. We can SAY something is delicious or beautiful as an expression of fact from a personal point of view, yet these things simply don't exist as independent truths even if everyone on the planet agrees with the assessment. |
I wasn't speaking morally, I was speaking epistemologically. The question of the existence of God is not a moral question subject to moral fictionalism or any other moral system. It's a philosophical question. Your question made the assumption that the only valid answer was a fundamental non-belief, yet such an assumption itself is either a belief (in which case the system collapses), or is a fundamental non-belief (in which case the system is self-referencing and attempts to validate itself). |
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03/28/2011 10:00:13 PM · #864 |
Originally posted by DrAchoo:
Your question made the assumption that the only valid answer was a fundamental non-belief, yet such an assumption itself is either a belief (in which case the system collapses), or is a fundamental non-belief (in which case the system is self-referencing and attempts to validate itself). |
In that case, you could say the same thing about bigfoot. My framework isn't the one requiring validation. As an ontologically positive claim, the burden of proof is on YOU to demonstrate validity. |
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03/28/2011 10:18:51 PM · #865 |
Originally posted by scalvert:
Originally posted by DrAchoo:
Your question made the assumption that the only valid answer was a fundamental non-belief, yet such an assumption itself is either a belief (in which case the system collapses), or is a fundamental non-belief (in which case the system is self-referencing and attempts to validate itself). |
In that case, you could say the same thing about bigfoot. My framework isn't the one requiring validation. As an ontologically positive claim, the burden of proof is on YOU to demonstrate validity. |
You said my system was based on belief (and thus is invalid). I was merely pointing out that your own system is, likewise, based on belief. I just don't think you realized it. You claim to only adhere to systems that are based on fundamental, non-belief principles. This claim rings true in all your posts on science and now on your posts on morality. Since morality is, in your view, not provable by fundamental, non-belief principles, you dismiss it as fiction. But you fail to realize that your entire system (like all systems) is ultimately axiomatic and so, by your own thinking, is fiction as well.
Message edited by author 2011-03-28 22:19:53. |
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03/28/2011 10:20:39 PM · #866 |
Originally posted by DrAchoo:
SP, I'm not looking to drive you into the arms of Shannon since your position is closer to mine than his is, but I have an objection to your rational basis for morality. While I certainly agree with your axiom of personal autonomy, to be effective it seems dependent on another axiom which is the equality of all humans. In other words, you may value personal autonomy, but you may not see certain other individuals as being deserving of the same autonomy for some reason. What is the fundamental rational for understanding the equality of all humans? You know my answer already, but what is the formulation of your own? |
Just posting this again for SP. I'm much more interested in this line of thinking. |
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03/29/2011 10:25:41 AM · #867 |
Originally posted by DrAchoo:
SP, I'm not looking to drive you into the arms of Shannon since your position is closer to mine than his is, but I have an objection to your rational basis for morality. While I certainly agree with your axiom of personal autonomy, to be effective it seems dependent on another axiom which is the equality of all humans. In other words, you may value personal autonomy, but you may not see certain other individuals as being deserving of the same autonomy for some reason. What is the fundamental rational for understanding the equality of all humans? You know my answer already, but what is the formulation of your own? |
Getting an individual or group to recognize the common humanity of other individuals or groups is the central work of moral improvement throughout history. This goes back to the in-group/out-group discussions we have had previously. The "fundamental rationale for understanding the equality of all humans" is understanding that we share the fundamental experience of being human - we all experience joy, suffer loss, hope, love and fear in essentially the same way. Convincing others that this is true is where the work of social progress is done (e.g., Rorty's sad stories, Sojourner Truth's "Ain't I A Woman" speech, pictures of gay couples on their wedding day, etc.).
I've never claimed that having some objective basis for moral analysis makes the work of obtaining acceptance for moral progress easier. Indeed, the objective moral basis that I am claiming itself is quite narrow, even though I think it has broad implications for how a "moral" society should be structured.
As far as your own answer as to the basis for human equality - you* don't seem to get that:
1) "we are all God's children" as a basis for human equality is only persuasive if (a) God is real and (b) the target of your persuasion is also a believer;
2) that the "we" in the phrase has historically, and even explicitly in scripture, been narrowly defined, it is only in the modern world that the idea of a universal creation of all humankind was embraced; and
3) even without the problem of "separate creation" on which so many pre-modern thinkers hung their racists hats, biblical authority seems to have no problem with the idea that some of God's children are more equal than others, providing a basis for the oppression of whatever out-group happened to be (dis)favored at the moment.
*(and Brog too. I'm almost through with that book BTW. I have to read it in short bursts to keep the blood pressure down. ;) Will shoot you an IM when I'm done.)
edited for readability
Message edited by author 2011-03-29 16:13:21. |
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03/30/2011 10:47:10 AM · #868 |
[moved to other thread...]
Message edited by author 2011-03-30 12:23:13.
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03/30/2011 11:19:58 AM · #869 |
Ed's gonna kill you for putting that in the atheist thread... ;)
Give me some time to ponder. My answers are better if I do that. I am part of a small intellectual group at church and last Monday we debated question #2 for over an hour so there may be some disagreement among adherents. |
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03/30/2011 02:47:11 PM · #870 |
Originally posted by DrAchoo:
there may be some disagreement among adherents. |
Can you find a statement for which that would not be the case? ;) |
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03/30/2011 03:21:25 PM · #871 |
Originally posted by BrennanOB:
Originally posted by DrAchoo:
there may be some disagreement among adherents. |
Can you find a statement for which that would not be the case? ;) |
"I believe." Everything after that is subject to dispute. |
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03/31/2011 10:22:37 AM · #872 |
Question for the fellow atheists: How many of you refer to yourselves as "skeptics" and/or identify with the "skeptical movement"?
Scientific Skepticism
Skeptic Organizations
A Skeptical Manifesto
Message edited by author 2011-03-31 10:27:42. |
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03/31/2011 10:52:13 PM · #873 |
I'm a cynic, more than a skeptic. |
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04/01/2011 12:30:28 AM · #874 |
CYNIC, n. Someone who looks both ways when crossing a one-way street.
-A Dictionary of Wit, Wisdom, and Satire, Herbert V. Prochnow and Herbert V. Prochnow, Jr.
CYNIC, n. A blackguard whose faulty vision sees things as they are, not as they ought to be. Hence the custom among the Scythians of plucking out a cynic's eyes to improve his vision.
-The Devil's Dictionary, Ambrose Bierce |
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04/01/2011 01:04:33 AM · #875 |
Originally posted by GeneralE:
CYNIC, n. Someone who looks both ways when crossing a one-way street.
-A Dictionary of Wit, Wisdom, and Satire, Herbert V. Prochnow and Herbert V. Prochnow, Jr.
CYNIC, n. A blackguard whose faulty vision sees things as they are, not as they ought to be. Hence the custom among the Scythians of plucking out a cynic's eyes to improve his vision.
-The Devil's Dictionary, Ambrose Bierce |
Yup. lol. That sounds like me :D |
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