?s about atheism but were afraid to ask

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03/24/2011 11:42:54 AM · #826

Originally posted by DrAchoo:

Do your three statements look different when you replace value with truth in the first line? Either way, I do see a problem with 1 and 2. I take away from 1 that the system is amoral; morality is fictional. I find it difficult then for statement 2 to have any teeth or even any meaning. I am fictionally outraged. *shrug* Also, how can something without existence operate upon you to make you outraged?

1. God is not real; he is fictional.
2. God caused me to be outraged at (insert outrage)

Don't you think statement 2 would be silly coming from an atheist? And if statement 1 is a definition of an atheist, wouldn't your statement 1 be a good definition of amorality?

I can't see any contradiction between

1) morality has no objective truth

2) I am morally outraged

I recognise that my body and brain will react to stimuli such as a ban on gay marriage and (because I have happily married gay friends and a whole bunch of other life influences and stimuli) my gut reaction will be indignation and one higher order expression of that is the perception of moral outrage.

I can understand that this process happens, and I can perceive the world couched in terms of morality. I can feel genuine moral outrage.

And I can also understand that people from different cultures and backgrounds with different life experiences will react differently, and I can rationalise what is progressive or regressive about each of these reactions (from my perspective) and come up with a preference that I would describe as morally superior.

I can and do do all of these things - and at the same time I know that we are all just a configuration of atoms and that their precise movement or order probably doesn't really matter except within human society.

Bear_Music

Samsung Galaxy S24 Ultra

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03/24/2011 11:53:20 AM · #827

Originally posted by scalvert:

Originally posted by shutterpuppy:
It's not fictional, it is a description of a moral assumption that can be derived logically from a universal characteristic of humanity. You seem to think that I am arguing for an external basis for morality, I'm not. The base assumption that I identify depends on nothing more than the human desire for others to respect our personal autonomy. This is purely secular, derived at by reason, and does not depend on any external source of moral value.

Edward, please step back and read what you're telling us. You say that you're not arguing for an external basis for morality, yet in both the prior and following sentences you describe the external basis for the morality of your example (that humans desire personal autonomy). Is personal autonomy right because we value it or do we value personal autonomy because it's right? If morality were an objective truth, then the second statement would be correct. What's really happening is that we reason the subjective opinion that personal autonomy is right from the objective fact that we desire it. Thus, morality is a personal beliefâ�� an imagined construct reasoned from the facts and other beliefs at hand. It does NOT stand on its own as a fact or objective truth without that reasoning. I'm pretty sure you agree with this, but aren't recognizing it.

I think you guys are using "external" to signify different things. You're both actually saying the same thing as far as I can see, though.

If that helps?

R.

03/24/2011 12:31:54 PM · #828

Originally posted by Bear_Music:

Originally posted by scalvert:
I'm pretty sure you agree with this, but aren't recognizing it.

I think you guys are using "external" to signify different things. You're both actually saying the same thing as far as I can see, though.

I think so, too. I have no problem with SP's assertion that morality may be derived from objective truths (as well as belief). Where I take exception is in the description of morality itself as an objective truth even if the base assumptions are true, which is where Jason was coming from. We don't judge the "rightness" of a 16 year old girl's personal freedom vs. an 18 year old girl's by the supposed truth of the moral statement "restricting personal autonomy is wrong." We go back to the real underlying facts and beliefs to reason a new opinion for that situation.

Message edited by author 2011-03-24 12:33:04.

03/24/2011 01:08:30 PM · #829

Originally posted by Matthew:

I can't see any contradiction between

1) morality has no objective truth

2) I am morally outraged

OK. But here is the difference between Subjectivism and Moral Error Theory. 1 may describe Subjectivism. In Error Theory the proper phrasing of 1 is "Morality has no truth whatsoever" because they will contend that there is no "truth" outside "objective truth" (as Shannon said, "what is "subjective truth""?)

Nikon AF Nikkor 50mm f/1.4D

03/24/2011 03:18:32 PM · #830

They're two sides of the same coin. It's false (objectively erroneous) that paper money has the intrinsic value printed on it, but also true that people agree to ascribe that value to it (a convention of subjective opinion). The Error Theorist has no problem acknowledging the fictional value assigned to a hundred dollar bill while still knowing that it's basically worthless paper, and the subjectivist would argue that the value of paper currency is a construct of societyâ�� fully aware that the paper itself has no actual value.

raish

Olympus C-2500L

03/24/2011 04:37:43 PM · #831

Two sides of the same banknote then...

03/24/2011 08:34:56 PM · #832

Originally posted by scalvert:

Where I take exception is in the description of morality itself as an objective truth even if the base assumptions are true, which is where Jason was coming from.

So you are just being obstinate?

Originally posted by scalvert:

We don't judge the "rightness" of a 16 year old girl's personal freedom vs. an 18 year old girl's by the supposed truth of the moral statement "restricting personal autonomy is wrong." We go back to the real underlying facts and beliefs to reason a new opinion for that situation.

I have no idea what your 16 vs. 18 year-old girl example is trying to get at, but we actually do argue morality based on competing claims to personal autonomy. What do you think is the basis for the argument, "How would you like it if someone did X to you?/your family?/your friend(s)?"; or the thought, "I wouldn't want someone to hurt/do X to me, so I shouldn't hurt/do X to others"?

03/24/2011 09:27:56 PM · #833

Originally posted by shutterpuppy:

So you are just being obstinate?

A matter of perspective. ;-)

Originally posted by shutterpuppy:

Of course we do. The basis for those claims is that we don't like X and believe others probably don't like X either. What do you think is the basis for the moral claim "X is bad"? The exact same underlying facts and beliefs that we used to form the first opinion. Clearly THOSE are the base assumptions, NOT the "truth" of the moral claim itself.

03/25/2011 10:30:50 AM · #834

Originally posted by scalvert:

Originally posted by shutterpuppy:
So you are just being obstinate?

A matter of perspective. ;-)

Originally posted by shutterpuppy:
I have no idea what your 16 vs. 18 year-old girl example is trying to get at, but we actually do argue morality based on competing claims to personal autonomy. What do you think is the basis for the argument, "How would you like it if someone did X to you?/your family?/your friend(s)?"; or the thought, "I wouldn't want someone to hurt/do X to me, so I shouldn't hurt/do X to others"?

Of course we do. The basis for those claims is that we don't like X and believe others probably don't like X either. What do you think is the basis for the moral claim "X is bad"? The exact same underlying facts and beliefs that we used to form the first opinion. Clearly THOSE are the base assumptions, NOT the "truth" of the moral claim itself.

You realize you are agreeing with me, right?

You are - stridently and with much fervor - arguing against a position I am not taking. I am not saying that moral truths are true in and of themselves - how would that square with my explicit position that any act approved by informed consensus may be considered moral?

The issue is, if you believe that morality is subjective is there any way to objectively critique the morality of others? Maybe you fall on the side of hard subjectivism and your answer to this is no - we can say we don't like something and tell people our reasons for not liking it, but we cannot tell them, objectively, they are wrong. If that's your position, fine. I don't agree.

The only thing that is required for an objective basis for critique is a base point of common reference. For believers, this is an external reference - a/k/a God - for a believer whatever God says is moral/immoral is, by definition.

My hypothesis is that there is at least one internal point of common reference that can be derived from simply being a sentient and sane human - each person's individual desire to have their own personal autonomy respected. If this is a valid assumption (common reference point), then there are certain objective moral implications, the most basic of which is that if you want others to respect your autonomy, you should respect the autonomy of others. (Otherwise you are being logically inconsistent.)

That there are people who want their own autonomy respected, but don't want to have to respect the autonomy of others doesn't invalidate the assumption. If people never desired to act badly, there would be no need for moral critique.

Perhaps you just don't like the way I am framing the reference point. I am couching it in philosophical terms, rather than speaking plainly, so fine - call it the "desire to not be messed with," or whatever other expression of "personal autonomy" doesn't get your hackles up. Or perhaps it is the moral/immoral language that gives you that apparently irresistible desire to jerk that knee, so fine - call it acceptable/unacceptable, good/bad, whatever. None of that changes the content of the argument - that accepting the subjective nature of morality does not equate with believing that there are no objective moral criteria.

Message edited by author 2011-03-25 10:34:58.

Pentax D-FA* 70-200mm f/2.8 ED DC AW

03/25/2011 10:43:25 AM · #835

One other thought - maybe the problem is that you don't like the word "objective." Again, I'm not claiming an external source for this objectivity.

To use the chess example, the rules of chess provide an internal framework for objectively evaluating who wins and who loses. But if you changed the rules, the objective framework would also change. Thus, from the outside, the game of chess is a subjective construct, but that doesn't change the fact that, internally, there is a common reference point for all players to objectively evaluate the game.

To extend this a little farther, when a chess player cheats, say by moving a piece in a way not allowed, they violate the rules of the game - you could say that they have acted "immorally" per the common reference. But it would certainly make no sense to say that the movement of the piece is "immoral" outside the reference of the game - outside of chess, moving a piece in any particular way would have absolutely no "moral" implication, because there is no common reference.

K3Master

Pentax K-3

03/25/2011 10:54:51 AM · #836

Originally posted by shutterpuppy:

Originally posted by scalvert:

Originally posted by shutterpuppy:
So you are just being obstinate?

A matter of perspective. ;-)

Originally posted by shutterpuppy:
I have no idea what your 16 vs. 18 year-old girl example is trying to get at, but we actually do argue morality based on competing claims to personal autonomy. What do you think is the basis for the argument, "How would you like it if someone did X to you?/your family?/your friend(s)?"; or the thought, "I wouldn't want someone to hurt/do X to me, so I shouldn't hurt/do X to others"?

Of course we do. The basis for those claims is that we don't like X and believe others probably don't like X either. What do you think is the basis for the moral claim "X is bad"? The exact same underlying facts and beliefs that we used to form the first opinion. Clearly THOSE are the base assumptions, NOT the "truth" of the moral claim itself.

You realize you are agreeing with me, right?

You are - stridently and with much fervor - arguing against a position I am not taking. I am not saying that moral truths are true in and of themselves - how would that square with my explicit position that any act approved by informed consensus may be considered moral?

The issue is, if you believe that morality is subjective is there any way to objectively critique the morality of others? Maybe you fall on the side of hard subjectivism and your answer to this is no - we can say we don't like something and tell people our reasons for not liking it, but we cannot tell them, objectively, they are wrong. If that's your position, fine. I don't agree.

The only thing that is required for an objective basis for critique is a base point of common reference. For believers, this is an external reference - a/k/a God - for a believer whatever God says is moral/immoral is, by definition.

My hypothesis is that there is at least one internal point of common reference that can be derived from simply being a sentient and sane human - each person's individual desire to have their own personal autonomy respected. If this is a valid assumption (common reference point), then there are certain objective moral implications, the most basic of which is that if you want others to respect your autonomy, you should respect the autonomy of others. (Otherwise you are being logically inconsistent.)

That there are people who want their own autonomy respected, but don't want to have to respect the autonomy of others doesn't invalidate the assumption. If people never desired to act badly, there would be no need for moral critique.

Perhaps you just don't like the way I am framing the reference point. I am couching it in philosophical terms, rather than speaking plainly, so fine - call it the "desire to not be messed with," or whatever other expression of "personal autonomy" doesn't get your hackles up. Or perhaps it is the moral/immoral language that gives you that apparently irresistible desire to jerk that knee, so fine - call it acceptable/unacceptable, good/bad, whatever. None of that changes the content of the argument - that accepting the subjective nature of morality does not equate with believing that there are no objective moral criteria.

The real issue is that Scalvert needs to be RIGHT far more than he needs to be correct.

David Ey

Nikon D80

Nikon AF Micro-Nikkor 60mm f2.8D

03/25/2011 11:02:40 AM · #837

Originally posted by BrennanOB:

Originally posted by David Ey:
But, doesn't the opponent have to surrender?...and wouldn't that mean he was captured?

All you have to do is threaten the king, while not allowing any place to escape to. Once the threat is unaviodable, the game is over. The king never loses his head or bows down. It is considered bad form to knock over or touch the opponents king. Royalty has its benfits.

Yes, I remembered that but got busy and forgot to come back and correct my mistake.

03/25/2011 11:40:21 AM · #838

Yes, we agree...

Originally posted by shutterpuppy:

I am not saying that moral truths are true in and of themselves...

Originally posted by scalvert:

Where I take exception is in the description of morality itself as an objective truth even if the base assumptions are true...

Originally posted by shutterpuppy:

So you are just being obstinate?

No, we're in agreement! Go back to your original objection:

Originally posted by shutterpuppy:

Originally posted by Matthew:
However, you can never objectively assess whether something is morally correct - it is an intangible that is always a subjective assessment based on many balancing factors. These will always be given different weight by different people.

Okay, as an atheist, skeptic and confirmed subjectivist, I am going to take the contrary stand. Morality can be both subjective and subject to objective analysis.

That's not a contrary stand. You were agreeing with us here, too. I think you misinterpreted the post right from the beginning. Matthew was already saying that 'you can never objectively assess whether something is morally correct' (moral truths are not true in and of themselves) â�� it is an intangible that is always a subjective assessment based on many balancing factors (the underlying facts and opinions, such as our desire for personal autonomy, that led to the moral conclusion)... and you objected. My posts emphasize this point:

Originally posted by scalvert:

ALL opinions, moral or otherwise, are subjective (that's what makes them opinions). What I said is that we should consider the objective facts underlying an opinion rather than assuming the opinion itself true, and that merely declaring something right or wrong doesn't make it a fact. "Now, there may be very valid reasons for that opinion, but being inherently right or wrong isn't one of them."

Same goes for my posts on stealing, speed limits, manners, etc. When we say something is right or wrong, we are basing that opinion on reasoning from underlying facts and beliefs rather than inherent rightness or wrongness. We agree that there may be base assumptions and facts (as well as opinions) that we reference to support a moral belief, AND we agree that moral truths are not true in and of themselves. Remember, the point of Jason's discussion here was whether 'moral truths are true in and of themselves,' NOT whether the reasoning that led to that belief is true. We also agree that we give weight to those non-moral (or objective) base assumptions "because then you're considering facts, not opinion." Matthew appeared to concur and this is where we were when you came along to take "a contrary stand." So if we agree, what were you objecting to? How is your stand contrary at all?

Message edited by author 2011-03-25 12:33:20.

03/25/2011 12:39:17 PM · #839

But I am being contrary to Matthew's assertion - partly by rejecting the idea that objectivity is inherently unavailable and partly by rejecting the correctness of the unstated frame of reference.

I say that you can objectively assess whether something that one human does to another human has moral implications. ("Moral" being something that is inherently right or wrong, again in reference to the internal framework in which all humans exist.)

That an objective assessment of right and wrong conduct by humans might be meaningless to non-humans is, frankly, an irrelevant distraction. Who cares if the microbial bacteria of my back yard, the rats of London's sewers or the worker drones serving the hive mind of Centauri XII value their personal autonomy? The possible externality of "moral truths" for humans is irrelevant because assessments of human morality are about judging the rightness/wrongness of human conduct.

By focusing on whether there can be external "moral truths" you are actually falling into the believer's way of thinking, and ceding an important rhetorical position that preferences external points of reference. The only reference we have access to is our own internal framework (note, this is the big problem for believers because there is not clear expression of the "mind of God"). And further, as a non-believer the only reference that matters to the question is the internal human framework.

03/25/2011 01:15:46 PM · #840

Originally posted by shutterpuppy:

I say that you can objectively assess whether something that one human does to another human has moral implications. ("Moral" being something that is inherently right or wrong, again in reference to the internal framework in which all humans exist.)

We agree to some extent here, too...

Originally posted by Matthew:

I can and do do all of these things - and at the same time I know that we are all just a configuration of atoms and that their precise movement or order probably doesn't really matter except within human society.

Originally posted by scalvert:

Morals are a construct of society, period. They are true only because society says they are true (as Brennan just demonstrated with shifting moral viewpoints). Moral claims are NOT objective facts as you claim, but ideas collectively agreed upon and subject to change.

Originally posted by shutterpuppy:

To extend this a little farther, when a chess player cheats, say by moving a piece in a way not allowed, they violate the rules of the game - you could say that they have acted "immorally" per the common reference. But it would certainly make no sense to say that the movement of the piece is "immoral" outside the reference of the game [because the rules are a fictional construct that only exist because we say so]

We're all acknowledging that
1. morality itself is a fictional construct of society, a convention of cultural agreement that says something is right or wrong.
2. we arrive at that moral conclusion when our underlying reasons lead to common beliefs.
3. those underlying reasons may or may not be true or shared by all.

So one person might believe killing is wrong because God said so, and another might believe it's wrong because it causes suffering. Where those beliefs coincide (even if the reasoning differs), you get a widely held moral opinion. Where they disagree (eating with your left hand is wrong) you get a regional or personal moral opinion. In either case they remain opinions rather than facts of their own per point #1, and sharing a common reference does not change this. If 50% of people believe killing is wrong because God said so and 50% believe it's wrong because it causes suffering, then that shared moral conclusion is an opinion formed from different lines of reasoning. If religion became extinct in nine countries and 100% of those people believed killing was wrong because it causes suffering, then the shared moral conclusion is an opinion derived from the same line of reasoning. The reasoning is objective (that people suffer), but the moral statement remains a subjective "ought" based on that universal rationaleâ�� a fictional 'rules of the game' that everyone happens to agree with. See? You can objectively assess whether the reasoning is the same, or even that everyone agrees killing is wrong, but the moral premise itself- what OUGHT to be- is necessarily subjective.

Message edited by author 2011-03-25 13:24:34.

03/25/2011 03:18:35 PM · #841

Originally posted by scalvert:

No, we are decidedly NOT all acknowledging this. You are either deliberately misstating my position, have completely misunderstood the argument or some combination of the two.

#2 and #3 provide an decent description of the process by which societies arrive at shared moral conclusions, but completely sidestep the issue of whether there might actually be objective ways to critique that process. You are conflating agreement with underlying bases for moral conclusion, with the question of the actual existence of the underlying bases themselves.

"God is the source of morality," is a flawed basis for moral conclusions because, fundamentally, there is no evidence that such a source (God) actually exists, not because we don't all agree on what particular tenets such a morality would entail.

Message edited by author 2011-03-25 15:19:04.

03/25/2011 04:35:39 PM · #842

Originally posted by shutterpuppy:

#2 and #3 provide an decent description of the process by which societies arrive at shared moral conclusions, but completely sidestep the issue of whether there might actually be objective ways to critique that process. You are conflating agreement with underlying bases for moral conclusion, with the question of the actual existence of the underlying bases themselves.

1. morality itself is a fictional construct of society, a convention of cultural agreement that says something is right or wrong.
2. we arrive at that moral conclusion when our underlying reasons lead to common beliefs.
3. those underlying reasons may or may not be true or shared by all, and there may be objective ways to assess whether those reasons are true and the rationale sound.

Is this what you're going for? If so, then we still agree:

Originally posted by scalvert:

What I said is that we should consider the objective facts underlying an opinion rather than assuming the opinion itself true, and that merely declaring something right or wrong doesn't make it a fact.

If the base facts and assumptions are false, then the opinion of moral correctness is similarly flawed. If those assertions are valid, then the opinion of moral correctness will be more persuasive. If one says gay marriage is wrong, that's an opinion variously based on notions of potential harm to children or traditional marriage, diminished procreation, divine decree, personal distaste, etc. There may be objective ways to evaluate whether each of those reasons are sound or applicable, and that evaluation will help to support or debunk the argument. If all the facts are true, and all the reasoning sound, then that's a solid foundation for the opinion of moral "wrongness" that follows... which is why I explained to Jason that facts carry more weight than beliefs. However, you're objectively critiquing the base assumptions and rationale, not the moral proposition itself:

Originally posted by scalvert:

Moral philosophers since David Hume have debated whether values are objective, and thus factual. In A Treatise of Human Nature Hume pointed out there is no obvious way for a series of statements about what ought to be the case to be derived from a series of statements of what is the case. Those who insist there is a logical gulf between facts and values, such that it is fallacious to attempt to derive values from facts, include G. E. Moore, who called attempting to do so the Naturalistic fallacy." You cannot derive a value from facts, thus you can only use facts to justify an opinion of morality (even though it remains an opinion).

Message edited by author 2011-03-25 17:02:29.

03/25/2011 07:29:29 PM · #843

You guys are having an interesting discussion and I almost hate to butt in, but I am going to raise two points.

1) A serious issue with both error theory and subjectivism is the idea that we instinctively shift to a realist mode the second we are wronged. While esoteric conversations like this one are easy enough to have, it is nearly impossible to remain in the "ivory tower" when someone takes our wallet or lies to us or kills our child. We will speak as if we were wronged in a very real sense. We do not add or even seem to imply the proper "What you did is wrong (to my opinion)." While this does not prove realism, it does cut down on the practical muscle of the other two positions.

2) I was at the zoo yesterday with the kids and saw the usual "Do not feed the animals" signs. It seems like the argument is being made that it is better to say, "Do not feed the animals because it can make them sick" rathern than saying "Do not feed the animals because the zoo keeper says so." Of course the zoo keeper knows it can make the animals sick, but it seems the person demanding the first sign wants to consider for themselves whether it is reasonable or not to feed the animals. This strikes me as self-centered at best and arrogant at worst. It assumes that there can be no reasoning if we cannot, ourselves, understand it and that nobody, other than ourselves, is a better judge of reasonableness. For us to automatically assume there is no rational reasoning behind a moral precept just because we don't have it is, I think, possibly (though not always) in error.

03/25/2011 08:53:44 PM · #844

Originally posted by DrAchoo:

A serious issue with both error theory and subjectivism is the idea that we instinctively shift to a realist mode the second we are wronged... We will speak as if we were wronged in a very real sense. We do not add or even seem to imply the proper "What you did is wrong (to my opinion)."

We do say we were wronged in a "real" sense, but when asked why, we go right back to the non-moral reasons for that opinion. I can say, "You're full of crap" without having to add "in my opinion." You wouldn't just assume that's a statement of fact. You'd want to know the reason(s) I think so and/or reason the validity for yourself. Anytime you make a value judgement, the opinion is implied no matter how firmly you believe it. Crab is delicious [in my opinion], Bob Dylan can't sing [in my opinion], stealing is wrong [in my opinion], etc.

Originally posted by DrAchoo:

I was at the zoo yesterday with the kids and saw the usual "Do not feed the animals" signs...

That's an instruction, not a value judgement. If the sign said, "It's wrong to feed the animals," you might well ask yourself why. You don't take the proposition as true at face valueâ�� you seek the non-moral rationale behind that belief (most likely reasoning that it could make the animals sick). From the article you scoffed at: "Nowhere, however, does this account of how we come to make moral judgments presuppose that any of the beliefs in question are actually true (even approximately so)... the universe just doesnâ��t contain the requisite properties (goodness, wrongness, etc.) necessary to render any of them true." For an objective fact like "the sky is blue," I can simply point to the sky as proof, but what can you point to that shows something is good? You can't. You must transparently abandon the notion of inherent goodness and refer back to the reasons you believe that.

Message edited by author 2011-03-25 20:54:04.

03/26/2011 01:19:51 AM · #845

Originally posted by scalvert:

Originally posted by DrAchoo:
A serious issue with both error theory and subjectivism is the idea that we instinctively shift to a realist mode the second we are wronged... We will speak as if we were wronged in a very real sense. We do not add or even seem to imply the proper "What you did is wrong (to my opinion)."

We do say we were wronged in a "real" sense, but when asked why, we go right back to the non-moral reasons for that opinion. I can say, "You're full of crap" without having to add "in my opinion." You wouldn't just assume that's a statement of fact. You'd want to know the reason(s) I think so and/or reason the validity for yourself. Anytime you make a value judgement, the opinion is implied no matter how firmly you believe it. Crab is delicious [in my opinion], Bob Dylan can't sing [in my opinion], stealing is wrong [in my opinion], etc.

I dunno. I think the average person could very easily distiguish between an opinion like Bob Dylan can't sing and the "real" feeling they get when they are wronged. We instinctively understand this. I even disagree with your "You're full of crap" statement, because I think people will instinctively intepret that not at, "I think you're full of crap, but this is just my opinion" but rather "I think you're full of crap because I think you are misinformed about certain real facts" and expect to have a discussion on whether or not they are, indeed, correct or incorrect about whatever. At the very least, as I said, this is the instinctive "go to" position.

Originally posted by DrAchoo:

I was at the zoo yesterday with the kids and saw the usual "Do not feed the animals" signs...

Originally posted by Shannon:

I may agree the materialist needs to abandon that notion, but a non-materialist does not. We can, at least on a theoretical level, speak about the quality of "goodness" being a quality emanating from God just as other physical properties do.

Message edited by author 2011-03-26 01:20:45.

RayEthier

Canon EF-S 18-55mm f/3.5-5.6 USM

03/26/2011 05:34:59 AM · #846

Originally posted by DrAchoo:

... We can, at least on a theoretical level, speak about the quality of "goodness" being a quality emanating from God just as other physical properties do.

...Perhaps you could, but other wouldn't as they do not share the basis precept of your argument.

Ray

RayEthier

Canon EF-S 18-55mm f/3.5-5.6 USM

03/26/2011 06:03:04 AM · #847

Originally posted by RayEthier:

Originally posted by DrAchoo:
... We can, at least on a theoretical level, speak about the quality of "goodness" being a quality emanating from God just as other physical properties do.

...Perhaps you could, but other wouldn't as they do not share the basic precept of your argument.

Ray

Tamron SP AF 28-75mm f/2.8 XR Di for Canon

03/26/2011 01:11:33 PM · #848

Originally posted by RayEthier:

Yes, that's exactly what I meant. "We" as nonmaterialists.

BrennanOB

Canon EOS-1D Mark II

03/26/2011 02:23:52 PM · #849

Originally posted by scalvert:

Originally posted by DrAchoo:
I was at the zoo yesterday with the kids and saw the usual "Do not feed the animals" signs...

That's an instruction, not a value judgement. If the sign said, "It's wrong to feed the animals," you might well ask yourself why. You don't take the proposition as true at face valueâ�� you seek the non-moral rationale behind that belief

This reminds me of an incident at the San Francisco zoo a few years back on Christmas day. Three young men were taunting and throwing things at a tiger on display. The tiger climbed out of its enclosure and ate one of them. The general reaction around here was "good, serves the b**tard right". In other words his actions were so egregious that people were not sorry he died. Yet all he had done was throw twigs are a very tough animal. Why such a strong reaction? Because (IMHO) his pleasure in taunting a caged animal was seen as immoral. The physical actions that he took were against the regulations, but the reason he took those actions, the pleasure he derived at humiliating and harassing a creature, was what elicited such a strong reaction of disgust that many felt it was right that he died at the claws of the tiger. When you cross certain lines of acceptable behaviors, especially into the realm of those behaviors what seek pleasure at the pain of other beings, a moral revulsion kicks in, and people not longer treat you with compassion. Whatever happens to you, you deserve.

RayEthier