?s about Xtianity but were afraid to ask

04/06/2011 01:17:56 AM · #1476

Originally posted by scalvert:

In the same article you referenced, Joyce described the hypothetical "David" as believing punching babies is wrong and an idea that sickens him. Clearly that is a moral judgement even if based entirely on non-moral reasoning, and it would be grossly inaccurate to label David amoral as you're doing.

Ummm...read your paper again...

"David doesnâ��t believe that punching babies is morally wrong, but we can imagine various situations in which heâ��ll have good reason to utter the sentence â��Punching babies is morally wrong.â��"

Nice try at the dodge though...

If it makes you feel any better I'll give you kudos to say you rarely make such blatant factual mistakes as you just did here, but nevertheless your summarized quote is perfectly incorrect.

Message edited by author 2011-04-06 01:28:13.

Canon FD 70-210mm f/4.0 MF

04/06/2011 11:27:11 AM · #1477

Originally posted by DrAchoo:

Ummm... read my post again. I didn't say David believed punching babies is morally wrong. He doesn't. I said he makes "a moral judgement even if based entirely on non-moral reasoning." How would this NOT be considered a moral judgement: "[David] believes that baby-punching ought to be prevented and perpetrators severely dealt with." That, ladies and gentlemints, is a declaration of would OUGHT to occur... what should be right... a thing we call a moral judgement. One can still believe situations are right or wrong (the opposite of amorality) by social norms and personal reasoning even if right and wrong do not exist as independent truths (literal amorality). I maintain that a $100 bill has a transactional value of $100 by social consensus even as I freely acknowledge that the same piece of paper is literally worth less than 10Â¢.

You have been continually implying that if people don't believe right and wrong are objective truths, then they can't hold the subjective belief that something is right or wrong. That's cuckoo. I don't believe "delicious" exists as a truth that I can point out as objectively correct, but I can still think Ben & Jerry's New York Superfudge Chunk is delicious... and sinful, and appealing, and expensive and all sorts of other things that don't really exist as objective fact.

Message edited by author 2011-04-06 11:28:26.

shutterpuppy

Sony Alpha a7

04/06/2011 11:59:13 AM · #1478

Originally posted by DrAchoo:

You guys are more dramatic than my daughter. Sheesh.

In case you are off on some tangent, I'm saying that free will is not compatible with your worldviews. I am open to being corrected by a case that satisfies three criteria:

1) Free Will is defined in a robust way that reflects the popular interpretation people use. Causa sui.
2) It does not make an ontological claim that is not supported by clear evidence.
3) It is compatible with naturalistic materialism.

I await your enlightenment...

I think you have a false sense of their being only two options when it comes to free will. You appear to believe that it is either:

A) total contra-causal free will - people are always able to make choices, independent of any causal influence, thus everyone bears full and complete responsibility for all actions/choices that they make since they were perfectly free to make the other choice, or

B) total determinism - all actions/choices are completely predetermined, thus no one bears any responsibility for any action/"choice" that they make since they were never free to make any other choice.

This is a false dichotomy. Acknowledging that our decisions are causal does not prevent conscious choice. It does, however, mean that understanding how our decisions are influenced by causal agents is very important if we want to better ourselves and our societies.

Originally posted by Naturalism.org: How Do We Solve Our Problems?:

By understanding that you are caused, and by seeing just how you are caused, you gain control and power over yourself. And remember, human beings have causal powers just as much as the factors that created them. But instead of supposing you can just will yourself to be other than you are, you understand that self-change and effective action flow from concrete conditions. Create the right conditions, then self-change and self-efficacy will follow. Naturalism also permits us to be wiser in setting up conditions under which we behave well toward each other. After all, since actions always result from causes, not from a mysterious uncontrollable free will, we can learn to control those causes to our benefit and the benefit of others we interact with. This translates into being more effective at work, in family and social situations, and in our efforts to achieve such things as environmental sustainability, which may well require wholesale change in attitudes and behavior. Understanding the determinants of our own personal and mass psychology is perhaps the key to success in taking collective control of ourselves such that we can continue to flourish here on earth.

To take an extreme example - an alcoholic who wants to avoid drinking may know that, if put into a particular situation, the compulsion to drink may be overwhelming and will thus order his or her life so that they do not find themselves in that situation. That is acknowledging the causal nature of our decision-making processes and effecting change based on that causal understanding.

There is a lot of really fascinating research currently going on that is uncovering the way decision making is highly influenced by physical conditions - both external and internal.

04/06/2011 12:48:45 PM · #1479

Originally posted by scalvert:

Originally posted by DrAchoo:
Ummm...read your paper again...

"David doesnâ��t believe that punching babies is morally wrong, but we can imagine various situations in which heâ��ll have good reason to utter the sentence â��Punching babies is morally wrong.â��"

Ummm... read my post again. I didn't say David believed punching babies is morally wrong. He doesn't. I said he makes "a moral judgement even if based entirely on non-moral reasoning." How would this NOT be considered a moral judgement: "[David] believes that baby-punching ought to be prevented and perpetrators severely dealt with." That, ladies and gentlemints, is a declaration of would OUGHT to occur... what should be right... a thing we call a moral judgement. One can still believe situations are right or wrong (the opposite of amorality) by social norms and personal reasoning even if right and wrong do not exist as independent truths (literal amorality). I maintain that a $100 bill has a transactional value of $100 by social consensus even as I freely acknowledge that the same piece of paper is literally worth less than 10Â¢.

You have been continually implying that if people don't believe right and wrong are objective truths, then they can't hold the subjective belief that something is right or wrong. That's cuckoo. I don't believe "delicious" exists as a truth that I can point out as objectively correct, but I can still think Ben & Jerry's New York Superfudge Chunk is delicious... and sinful, and appealing, and expensive and all sorts of other things that don't really exist as objective fact.

Just make up your mind Shannon. Are you a Moral Error Theorist or a Subjectivist?!? I don't even think you understand the difference. "Wrong" has zero meaning to a moral error theorist. It is a word with no factual basis. What you might be meaning to say is that "David believes there are reasons not to punch babies." Note there is no "wrong" in there and it's perfectly reasonable for David to hold this position. But once you put the word "wrong" in, you are now making a moral statement and as a Moral Error Theorist you are then lying (as the article explains). I think I know this article now better than you do.

Only in your little mind can you believe these two sets of statements are compatible.

1) David believes punching babies is wrong.
2) That is a moral statement.

and

1) David does not believe punching babies is morally wrong.

100% Orwellian doublethink.

Message edited by author 2011-04-06 12:50:06.

Pentax D-FA* 70-200mm f/2.8 ED DC AW

04/06/2011 01:13:35 PM · #1480

Originally posted by shutterpuppy:

I was hoping you'd speak up because I remember you've thought about this issue some and I wanted to know what your opinion was. I do not need to set up a false dichotomy. The fundamental question is whether there are any causa sui decisions or not, not if they all are. Really, you only need one instance for it to destroy natural materialism under which such a decision is impossible. Natural materialism states that every effect has a natural, physical cause. The chain is unbroken. And adding quantum uncertainty to the mix does not help the case. In that instance, the cause is randomness which is hardly a capable source for directed action.

Originally posted by Naturalism.org: How Do We Solve Our Problems?:

By understanding that you are caused, and by seeing just how you are caused, you gain control and power over yourself. And remember, human beings have causal powers just as much as the factors that created them. But instead of supposing you can just will yourself to be other than you are, you understand that self-change and effective action flow from concrete conditions. Create the right conditions, then self-change and self-efficacy will follow. Naturalism also permits us to be wiser in setting up conditions under which we behave well toward each other. After all, since actions always result from causes, not from a mysterious uncontrollable free will, we can learn to control those causes to our benefit and the benefit of others we interact with. This translates into being more effective at work, in family and social situations, and in our efforts to achieve such things as environmental sustainability, which may well require wholesale change in attitudes and behavior. Understanding the determinants of our own personal and mass psychology is perhaps the key to success in taking collective control of ourselves such that we can continue to flourish here on earth.

[/quote]

Your quote has a bit of doublethink in it as well (but I'll try to be a bit more civil with you since you've always shown civility). I have bolded all the action words in the paragraph. Do those words mean anything if there are, in themselves, caused by external factors? How do we gain control in any meaningful way if all internal states are ultimately dictated by external ones? It makes no sense to me. The author asserts that "human beings have causal powers just as much as the factors that created them", but we will reflect that under naturalism we were all created by natural, physical and chemical processes. A hydrogen atom may have causal powers, but nobody would say it has any will in the matter. Any causal power it has is a product of effects placed upon it previously. All he is saying is that humans are part of the causal chain which is consistent with a naturalistic position, but inconsistent with the idea that we can "gain control" or "set up conditions" or make "wholesale change" in any way other than what is dicated by other causes. If those causes are internal, the internal causes themselves are caused by external forces. There is no causa sui.

So this is not "free will" in any way that most people understand the term. Though we are part of the causal chain, we cannot direct things any more than a rock, a wave, or an atom.

K3Master

Pentax K-3

04/06/2011 01:24:31 PM · #1481

Originally posted by DrAchoo:

Originally posted by shutterpuppy:
I think you have a false sense of their being only two options when it comes to free will. You appear to believe that it is either:

A) total contra-causal free will - people are always able to make choices, independent of any causal influence, thus everyone bears full and complete responsibility for all actions/choices that they make since they were perfectly free to make the other choice, or

B) total determinism - all actions/choices are completely predetermined, thus no one bears any responsibility for any action/"choice" that they make since they were never free to make any other choice.

This is a false dichotomy. Acknowledging that our decisions are causal does not prevent conscious choice. It does, however, mean that understanding how our decisions are influenced by causal agents is very important if we want to better ourselves and our societies.

I was hoping you'd speak up because I remember you've thought about this issue some and I wanted to know what your opinion was. I do not need to set up a false dichotomy. The fundamental question is whether there are any causa sui decisions or not, not if they all are. Really, you only need one instance for it to destroy natural materialism under which such a decision is impossible. Natural materialism states that every effect has a natural, physical cause. The chain is unbroken. And adding quantum uncertainty to the mix does not help the case. In that instance, the cause is randomness which is hardly a capable source for directed action.

Originally posted by Naturalism.org: How Do We Solve Our Problems?:

By understanding that you are caused, and by seeing just how you are caused, you gain control and power over yourself. And remember, human beings have causal powers just as much as the factors that created them. But instead of supposing you can just will yourself to be other than you are, you understand that self-change and effective action flow from concrete conditions. Create the right conditions, then self-change and self-efficacy will follow. Naturalism also permits us to be wiser in setting up conditions under which we behave well toward each other. After all, since actions always result from causes, not from a mysterious uncontrollable free will, we can learn to control those causes to our benefit and the benefit of others we interact with. This translates into being more effective at work, in family and social situations, and in our efforts to achieve such things as environmental sustainability, which may well require wholesale change in attitudes and behavior. Understanding the determinants of our own personal and mass psychology is perhaps the key to success in taking collective control of ourselves such that we can continue to flourish here on earth.

Your quote has a bit of doublethink in it as well (but I'll try to be a bit more civil with you since you've always shown civility). I have bolded all the action words in the paragraph. Do those words mean anything if there are, in themselves, caused by external factors? How do we gain control in any meaningful way if all internal states are ultimately dictated by external ones? It makes no sense to me. The author asserts that "human beings have causal powers just as much as the factors that created them", but we will reflect that under naturalism we were all created by natural, physical and chemical processes. A hydrogen atom may have causal powers, but nobody would say it has any will in the matter. Any causal power it has is a product of effects placed upon it previously. All he is saying is that humans are part of the causal chain which is consistent with a naturalistic position, but inconsistent with the idea that we can "gain control" or "set up conditions" or make "wholesale change" in any way other than what is dicated by other causes. If those causes are internal, the internal causes themselves are caused by external forces. There is no causa sui.

So this is not "free will" in any way that most people understand the term. Though we are part of the causal chain, we cannot direct things any more than a rock, a wave, or an atom.

This, dare I say it, psychopathic need to put everyone and everything under some authoritative label is what REALLY disturbs me. You have this incessant need for everything to be packaged neatly so you can 'understand' it based on your own false assumptions and beliefs. I mean, if it helps you through life, whatever, but it's really quite maddening :D As much as Scalvert has a psychotic need to always be right, and I take a psychotic pleasure at poking sticks into wasps nests, really. I guess that's what makes this area of this place so much fun.

Message edited by author 2011-04-06 13:25:42.

04/06/2011 02:12:51 PM · #1482

Originally posted by DrAchoo:

Are you a Moral Error Theorist or a Subjectivist?!? I don't even think you understand the difference. "Wrong" has zero meaning to a moral error theorist.

In terms of objective fact, that's true. In terms of personal opinion, it's a load of crap. "Delicious" also has zero meaning as objective fact, but we can certainly hold the opinion that something is delicious. You are completely ignoring this obvious point.

Only in your little mind can you believe these two sets of statements aren't compatible.

1) David personally believes punching babies is wrong as a personal opinion.
2) That is a moral statement.

and

1) David does not believe punching babies is morally wrong (or right) as an objective fact.

04/06/2011 02:18:20 PM · #1483

Sorry, Ed. It's just a product of the written form of communication we are having. If we were having a beer we could spend fifteen minutes creating the "customized position" that each of us represents on any given topic. That takes way too much time in a forum and so assumptions have to be made. Since I assume that all of us appeal to authority on some level in philosophy (ie. none of us are professional philosophers) we may as well not reinvent the wheel. Believe it or not, almost any philosophical idea you have has been thought of by someone else already and likely given a name (though the names, admittedly, can get really confusing. Moral nihilism, moral error theory, moral skepticism, moral fictionalism. Are they all the same thing? Slight variations on a theme? Totally different?)

When I declare that someone needs to be one or the other of something, it's generally because there is a logical or definitional contradiction between the two. What maddens me is when people appeal to an -ism as one that has speakers of authority, but then make arguments contrary to the -ism. You can't both hide in the skirtfolds of the expert and not abide by their dictates.

Actually I have found the conversation generally interesting until last night when it got off track. SP, I think, will provide an interesting conversation about Free Will. Just don't get upset if we start talking about labels again like "hard determinism" or the like.

04/06/2011 02:26:21 PM · #1484

Originally posted by scalvert:

Only in your little mind can you believe these two sets of statements aren't compatible.

1) David personally believes punching babies is wrong as a personal opinion.
2) That is a moral statement.

and

1) David does not believe punching babies is morally wrong (or right) as an objective fact.

Whatever dude.

If David believes punching babies is wrong as an opinion for moral reasons, it's a moral statement and he believes it is morally wrong as a personal opinion. (This is subjectivism.)

If David believes there are reasons not to punch babies as an opinion for exclusively non-moral reasons (maybe it messes up his nice shirt), it's not a moral statement and he believes there are reasons not to do it. (This is MET and amoralism)

You can claim whichever you want, but you can't claim both.

04/06/2011 02:33:08 PM · #1485

Originally posted by DrAchoo:

I assume that all of us appeal to authority on some level in philosophy... When I declare that someone needs to be one or the other of something, it's generally because there is a logical or definitional contradiction between the two. What maddens me is when people appeal to an -ism as one that has speakers of authority, but then make arguments contrary to the -ism. You can't both hide in the skirtfolds of the expert and not abide by their dictates.

You can refer to an article to give an example or explanation of a specific concept without necessarily adopting that author's arguments for everything. I loathe labels, and until these threads never heard of Joyce, Dawkins or most other proponents of the various "isms" and "ists" you'd like to categorize me in. I prefer appealing to reason on its own rather than authority. Whether a given position happens to coincide with or contradict some authority or label is not a concern.

04/06/2011 02:35:11 PM · #1486

Originally posted by scalvert:

Originally posted by DrAchoo:

you can't claim both.

Thanks for the confirmation.

04/06/2011 03:14:23 PM · #1487

Shannon, don't butcher my post. That editing hack job is utterly uncalled for.

04/06/2011 03:34:08 PM · #1488

Originally posted by scalvert:

Originally posted by DrAchoo:
I assume that all of us appeal to authority on some level in philosophy... When I declare that someone needs to be one or the other of something, it's generally because there is a logical or definitional contradiction between the two. What maddens me is when people appeal to an -ism as one that has speakers of authority, but then make arguments contrary to the -ism. You can't both hide in the skirtfolds of the expert and not abide by their dictates.

You can refer to an article to give an example or explanation of a specific concept without necessarily adopting that author's arguments for everything. I loathe labels, and until these threads never heard of Joyce, Dawkins or most other proponents of the various "isms" and "ists" you'd like to categorize me in. I prefer appealing to reason on its own rather than authority. Whether a given position happens to coincide with or contradict some authority or label is not a concern.

Do us a favor then. When you engage in drive-by googling, let us know which portions of your links we should pay attention to and which we should not. You really stepped in it with your original link:

Originally posted by Shannon:

Yup. There's nothing objectively right or wrong about picking the dog. Of course, subjectively most people will strongly favor the boy.

So if I'm hearing you right, you linked that article just so you could appeal to authority that there is no objective right or wrong, but you don't want to take away any other messages from the article. It's ridiculous for you to think we can perceive exactly what you mean to reference and nothing else. It's also ridiculous to not understand that the things we are discussing are reasonable conclusions from your single claim ("there is no objective right or wrong"). I know you like to be vague because it later gives you plausible deniability (like your post here), but your lack of intellectual honesty is disturbing. I suggest you watch others debate for a while and pick up on the manner of having productive discourse.

04/06/2011 03:54:17 PM · #1489

Originally posted by DrAchoo:

Shannon, don't butcher my post. That editing hack job is utterly uncalled for.

Feel free to point out the inaccuracy. I said only you would think those two statements weren't compatible, to which you replied I couldn't claim both. I could post the entire quote and still thank you for the confirmation.

04/06/2011 04:04:13 PM · #1490

Originally posted by scalvert:

Originally posted by DrAchoo:
If we met someone who relates a story where they had to choose to save a dog or a person from a fire... could we objectively declare their choice to be incorrect? Can we objectively declare it incorrect and on what grounds?

No, there is nothing objectively correct about the choice. We can feel a choice is right or wrong for all sorts of subjective reasons, but objectively it IS meaningless.

Originally posted by DrAchoo:

I do not appeal to authority- I never heard of the guy. I was merely showing you a similar example from Philosophy Now that right and wrong may be objectively meaningless and one can still hold a subjective opinion of right and wrong (morality) based on reasoning... the exact same position I described two hours ago that I said only would would think is incompatible. You have ignored the point for days, even as I've posted other examples such as "delicious," choosing instead to attack irrelevant straw men, which is not my problem:

Originally posted by DrAchoo:

Richard Joyce was the author of the essay you linked on Moral Fictionalism. Soooo, if you identify with that paper, you are a moral nihilist...

Message edited by author 2011-04-06 16:09:20.

04/06/2011 04:28:09 PM · #1491

Originally posted by scalvert:

Originally posted by DrAchoo:
Shannon, don't butcher my post. That editing hack job is utterly uncalled for.

Feel free to point out the inaccuracy. I said only you would think those two statements weren't compatible, to which you replied I couldn't claim both. I could post the entire quote and still thank you for the confirmation.

Sigh.

Shannon, just answer me this one thing. When you say, "I said he makes "a moral judgement even if based entirely on non-moral reasoning."" how does one do that? That is completely, utterly paradoxical unless you are just using the term "moral judgement" to mean someone else thinks it's a moral judgement but David doesn't in which case it's the worst use of English I have come across.

I think you are just here to torment me.

Leica 35mm f/1.4 Summilux M Aspherical MF - Black

04/06/2011 04:46:25 PM · #1492

Originally posted by scalvert:

NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO. Once and for all NO!!! Read the fucking article and give me a single, clear line where Joyce tells us that someone can hold a "subjective opinion of right and wrong" and it means something. He will not use those words. He does not use those words. At very best the Moral Fictionalist can talk like he has a subjective opinion of right and wrong, but he knows this to be a lie.

I will give you statement after statement where Joyce would deny the very thing you are saying:

How can I in good faith make the judgment that something is morally wrong if I cannot also maintain that this judgment is true?

But as such linguistic practices (using words like "right" and "wrong") shade into their moral usages, the error theorist protests.

If the error theorist is correct, then the natural assumption is that we should eliminate moral considerations from our minds entirely, just as we have eliminated beliefs in mermaids and phlogiston.

Yet would it really be so awful to do away with morality? I donâ��t think so.

Contrary to a popular but almost entirely unexamined image, the moral error theorist may be as much a friendly, trustworthy, upstanding citizen as anyone else. True, he doesnâ��t believe that punching babies is morally wrong; but then again, nor does he believe that itâ��s morally right or morally permissible either. He doesnâ��t believe itâ��s morally anything.

Epistemological principles (concerning what one ought and ought not believe, given oneâ��s other beliefs) require any committed moral error theorist to discard his moral beliefs.

...So when a moral believer asks him his opinion of baby-punching, David could embark on a long and likely-to-be-horribly-misunderstood explanation of his non-moral grounds for opposing the action. But would we really accuse him of any great transgression if he simply says â��Baby-punching?! Oh, thatâ��s just morally wrong!â��? I, for one, sympathize with Davidâ��s decision. Even acknowledging that he has lied doesnâ��t lessen my sympathy, for I can see that itâ��s an understandable and harmless lie.

An important feature of fictive immersion is that when immersed one is distracted from the fact that one is an error theorist. Hence much of the time one speaks and acts and even thinks as if one really believes in morality. The idea is, then, that one can in this way gain some of the pragmatic benefits that come from sincere moral belief. And yet in doing so one violates no epistemological imperative since one doesnâ��t believe it; oneâ��s â��acceptanceâ�� of morality falls short of belief since one remains disposed to concede, if pressed in an appropriately serious and critical way, that itâ��s all false.

Message edited by author 2011-04-06 16:47:13.

scarbrd

Leica M10

04/06/2011 05:10:33 PM · #1493

For the record, I don't think baby punching is good idea. I don't even know how I got that reputation. ;-)

Nullix

Canon EF 17-40mm f/4.0L USM

04/06/2011 05:20:26 PM · #1494

Originally posted by DrAchoo:

Originally posted by scalvert:

I do not appeal to authority- I never heard of the guy. I was merely showing you a similar example from Philosophy Now that right and wrong may be objectively meaningless and one can still hold a subjective opinion of right and wrong (morality) based on reasoning...

NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO. Once and for all NO!!! Read the article and give me a single, clear line where Joyce tells us that someone can hold a "subjective opinion of right and wrong" and it means something. He will not use those words.

Yes. And when that happens, it will also snow in hell. Scalvert is like water, he can't be nailed down. He changes with what suits him. He can change his opinion to be hard as ice, liquid as a river, or evaporate like mist.

He reminds me of Phil Hendrie show. If you haven't hear him, he does a radio show with different characters. People call in and argue with the characters (thinking they're real people). The characters really take no stance on any issues, but just push buttons.

04/06/2011 05:21:13 PM · #1495

Originally posted by DrAchoo:

When you say, "I said he makes "a moral judgement even if based entirely on non-moral reasoning."" how does one do that?

The same way we make judgements about food being delicious, clothes being fashionable or artwork being beautiful. Can you objectively prove any of this? Nope.

04/06/2011 05:27:45 PM · #1496

Originally posted by scalvert:

Originally posted by DrAchoo:
When you say, "I said he makes "a moral judgement even if based entirely on non-moral reasoning."" how does one do that?

The same way we make judgements about food being delicious, clothes being fashionable or artwork being beautiful. Can you objectively prove any of this? Nope.

Yes, but when I say Paad Thai is delicious (mmmmmm...Paad Thai), I don't, when pressed, say it's all a lie. I say it's true, but possibly only true for me. Once again, for the zillionth time, this is the difference between MET and subjectivism.

Food is probably a poor example for your camp because one could probably objectively show it with a PET scan if we defined "delicious" in an organic brain manner. If your pleasure center lights up, hey, it's delicious to you. If it doesn't, nope, it's not.

Message edited by author 2011-04-06 17:28:10.

Canon FD 70-210mm f/4.0 MF

04/06/2011 05:30:37 PM · #1497

Originally posted by scarbrd:

For the record, I don't think baby punching is good idea. I don't even know how I got that reputation. ;-)

Man, and I've had you sleep in my house!!!

shutterpuppy

Sony Alpha a7

04/06/2011 05:45:40 PM · #1498

Originally posted by DrAchoo:

Originally posted by Naturalism.org: How Do We Solve Our Problems?:

By understanding that you are caused, and by seeing just how you are caused, you gain control and power over yourself. And remember, human beings have causal powers just as much as the factors that created them. But instead of supposing you can just will yourself to be other than you are, you understand that self-change and effective action flow from concrete conditions. Create the right conditions, then self-change and self-efficacy will follow. Naturalism also permits us to be wiser in setting up conditions under which we behave well toward each other. After all, since actions always result from causes, not from a mysterious uncontrollable free will, we can learn to control those causes to our benefit and the benefit of others we interact with. This translates into being more effective at work, in family and social situations, and in our efforts to achieve such things as environmental sustainability, which may well require wholesale change in attitudes and behavior. Understanding the determinants of our own personal and mass psychology is perhaps the key to success in taking collective control of ourselves such that we can continue to flourish here on earth.

Your quote has a bit of doublethink in it as well (but I'll try to be a bit more civil with you since you've always shown civility). I have bolded all the action words in the paragraph. Do those words mean anything if there are, in themselves, caused by external factors? How do we gain control in any meaningful way if all internal states are ultimately dictated by external ones? It makes no sense to me. The author asserts that "human beings have causal powers just as much as the factors that created them", but we will reflect that under naturalism we were all created by natural, physical and chemical processes. A hydrogen atom may have causal powers, but nobody would say it has any will in the matter. Any causal power it has is a product of effects placed upon it previously. All he is saying is that humans are part of the causal chain which is consistent with a naturalistic position, but inconsistent with the idea that we can "gain control" or "set up conditions" or make "wholesale change" in any way other than what is dicated by other causes. If those causes are internal, the internal causes themselves are caused by external forces. There is no causa sui.

It is not doublethink at all. Look back to the alcoholic example (which I note you completely ignored). A healthy human brain allows for analysis and planning. We know that these attributes are physical and not the product of some paranormal homunculus riding on our amygdala, because we observe that certain physical defects and/or damage to the brain can destroy these abilities in individuals. However, for the human with the healthy and normally functioning brain, these attributes allow us to take action that will affect the future causal chain for us and others and thus influence future actions.

I would encourage you to go and peruse through the Naturalism.org site. The design of the site is kind of bargain basement, but the resources on the site and to which it links are top notch. Also, I've (almost) read Brog, I would challenge you to read Thomas Clark's, Encountering Naturalism, or check out the podcast with the author at Point of Inquiry that covers this territory. A lot of your arguments on this issue come down to an appeal from incredulity - you just can't imagine how it would work, so you revert to your preferred option - dualism. The problem is that the evidence does not support your preferred option.

Regardless, I think you are making two fundamental mistakes that a lot of "dualist/contra-causal free will" thinkers make. The first is just underestimating and downplaying the immense complexity of the human brain and the human decision-making process. Our day-to-day decisions are the product of genetic influences, fetal development, brain architecture and chemistry, prior social and chemical influences, concurrent social and chemical influences, physiological influences, experience, cognitive ability, etc. Any particular decision/action is backed by a highly complex and intricate web of influences. This complexity provides for a lot of flexibility in the decision-making process, even in a completely causal framework. Also, our causal decision-making processes may be more like algorithmic processes that produce a range of possible outcomes from any particular set of inputs, rather than like a much more simple binary decision tree.

The second is that you and opponents to the idea of contra-causal free will appear to focus exclusively on the moment of any particular decision, and ignore the causal history that lead to the decision moment. The opportunity for causal control comes in influencing that history, not in being able to make some non-causal decision in the moment. The difference between the hydrogen atom and you is (one, complexity, and two,) that you have a brain whose physical properties allow you to analyze and understand the causal influences to which you are subject and take action to effect those causal influences so as to allow change in your future behaviors. That this ability is itself naturalistic and the product of causal actions, doesn't change the fact that you have that ability.

Originally posted by DrAchoo:

So this is not "free will" in any way that most people understand the term.

Too bad. Science is quickly coming to terms with the realization that the "way most people understand" "fee will" has almost assuredly been entirely wrong.

edited to fix URL

Message edited by author 2011-04-06 17:53:18.

04/06/2011 06:02:09 PM · #1499

Originally posted by DrAchoo:

give me a single, clear line where Joyce tells us that someone can hold a "subjective opinion of right and wrong" and it means something.

Just look at the subtitle: "what happens when falsehoods are too useful to throw out."

"What I have just described is a mundane defense of a fairly mundane form of moral fictionalism. It grants that a moral error theorist may continue to say things that he doesnâ��t believe (on occasion even assert them) on grounds of an unremarkable kind of expediency, while not being guilty of bad faith. Moral fictionalism gets more interesting and more controversial when it recommends that the error theorist â��immerseâ�� himself in the fiction in a rather more full-bodied fashion, such that he doesnâ��t just carry on using moral language, but also â��acceptsâ�� these falsehoods in a way that allows them some positive influence upon his decisions and motivations."

"I argued that the instrumental value of moral beliefs lies in their combating of weakness of will, their blocking of the temporary revaluing of outcomes that is characteristic of short-sighted rationalizations, their silencing of certain kinds of calculation. And it is my contention that these desiderata can be satisfied, to some extent, even if the moral claims are not believed."- Richard Joyce