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 03/22/2011 02:26:17 PM · #776
Law and morality are social constructs with ample opportunity to match up.
 03/22/2011 02:35:46 PM · #777
Originally posted by raish:
Law and morality are social constructs with ample opportunity to match up.


My only point is that it would be a rare person who would consider law and morality to be two names for the same construct. They are different and, thus, at times will not match up.
 03/22/2011 03:32:41 PM · #778
I thought your initial point was that morality is not a social construct.
 03/22/2011 03:34:32 PM · #779
Originally posted by DrAchoo:
Your opinion about Burqua or gay marriage or anything you consider "right" or "wrong" is by your admission, opinion. You might say that you have non-moral (or objective) grounds to believe them, but why should we give weight to those non-moral (or objective) grounds?

Because then you're considering facts, not opinion. Morals are a construct of society, period. They are true only because society says they are true (as Brennan just demonstrated with shifting moral viewpoints). Moral claims are NOT objective facts as you claim, but ideas collectively agreed upon and subject to change. We agree that a dollar bill has a certain transactional value and a hundred dollar bill is worth a hundred times as much. This, too, is a construct of society rather than an intrinsic fact. Objectively, the dollar is really worth about 6 cents in paper and ink and the hundred dollar bill is worth no more. Since that ascribed value is NOT objective fact, it's subject to change (just ask anyone holding Confederate money or a $100 trillion banknote from Zimbabwe). Aluminum used to be a precious metal more valuable than gold, "and Napoleon III's most important guests were given aluminium cutlery, while those less worthy dined with mere silver." Slavery was once considered "right" around the world, and now it's considered "wrong" around the world, so which moral claim is correct? Either side would have to turn to reason to support what turns out to be personal belief, so the only practical difference of someone acknowledging right off the bat that it's a personal belief supported by reason is intellectual honesty.

The Prop 8 supporters made several moral claims against gay marriage: that it would hurt traditional marriage, harm children, etc., and you have argued that moral propositions are factually true. However, when challenged to support these claims with evidence, the emperor turned out to be stark naked. As for your, "Well that's just the court system" argument... evidence and rational basis tend to be rather useful for credibility in debate, too.
 03/22/2011 03:55:27 PM · #780
Originally posted by scalvert:
Originally posted by DrAchoo:
Your opinion about Burqua or gay marriage or anything you consider "right" or "wrong" is by your admission, opinion. You might say that you have non-moral (or objective) grounds to believe them, but why should we give weight to those non-moral (or objective) grounds?

Because then you're considering facts, not opinion.


You do not follow.

Person A wants to convince Person B about Moral Precept X.
He presents objective facts A, B, C.

Person B asks, "why" objective facts A, B, and C compel him to accept Moral precept X.

Person A responds with objective facts D, E, F.

Person B asks, "why" objective facts D, E, and F compel him to accept facts A, B, and C compel him to believe Moral Precept X.

Repeat ad infinitum.

If Moral Precept X is a rational consequent of objective facts, why isn't it, in itself, an objective fact? And if it isn't, then aren't we interjecting some subjective opinion in between the objective facts and the moral precept? And if that's the case, then what does it matter than there are objective facts? We find ourselves back at square one with a subjective opinion.

Message edited by author 2011-03-22 15:59:01.
 03/22/2011 04:51:40 PM · #781
Originally posted by DrAchoo:
If Moral Precept X is a rational consequent of objective facts, why isn't it, in itself, an objective fact? And if it isn't, then aren't we interjecting some subjective opinion in between the objective facts and the moral precept? And if that's the case, then what does it matter than there are objective facts? We find ourselves back at square one with a subjective opinion.

It isn't, yes we are, and because opinion with a rational basis trumps irrational belief.
 03/22/2011 05:11:32 PM · #782
Originally posted by scalvert:
Originally posted by DrAchoo:
If Moral Precept X is a rational consequent of objective facts, why isn't it, in itself, an objective fact? And if it isn't, then aren't we interjecting some subjective opinion in between the objective facts and the moral precept? And if that's the case, then what does it matter than there are objective facts? We find ourselves back at square one with a subjective opinion.

It isn't, yes we are, and because opinion with a rational basis trumps irrational belief.


LOL. Is the statment "opinion with a rational basis trumps irrational belief." an objective truth or a subjective opinion?

Still finding turtles on my way down...

Message edited by author 2011-03-22 17:11:52.
 03/22/2011 05:21:09 PM · #783
Originally posted by DrAchoo:
If Moral Precept X is a rational consequent of objective facts, why isn't it, in itself, an objective fact?


Although their usage differs in different fields of study, there are real differences between Thesis, Theory, Law, and Fact. Heck, gravity has been around a long time, and it is just a humble law. Just because a thesis rubs up against a few accepted facts, it doesn't get to be a fact; at best it gets promoted to a theory for a bit. Once we are out int he heady realm of moral theory, accepted facts are pretty few and far between.
 03/22/2011 06:55:45 PM · #784
Originally posted by DrAchoo:

Still finding turtles on my way down...


Funny, I picture two stacks of turtles. There's the one you're pointing to (i.e. Shannon's) and the one your sitting on. Maybe you should check your stack first rather than just believing something is holding yours up.

Message edited by author 2011-03-22 18:56:52.
 03/23/2011 10:55:52 AM · #785
Originally posted by DrAchoo:
Still finding turtles on my way down...


Just skip to the bottom - cogito ergo sum and nothing more.

Not a fruitful line of enquiry - in order to have a sensible conversation I think that you probably have to accept some assumptions (e.g. we live in a universe and our senses convey information accurately within a broadly understood degree of tolerance).

03/23/2011 12:58:18 PM · #786
Originally posted by Matthew:
cogito ergo sum and nothing more.

I think, therefore I am... one of the most profound statements ever uttered. It should follow then that when I cease to think, I will no longer be. Makes sense to me. Faith, of course, has other ideas: that even with no thought we continue to exist in an afterlife with various positive or negative consequences depending on how we follow a set of assumed rules in this life. What, exactly, continues to exist when your brain no longer functions? The soul! OK, then what is that? Humans tend to perceive the world as if our "self" lives inside the container of our physical body peering out through the window of our eyes and other senses. That perception naturally gives rise the notion of an inner self constituting our soul or spiritual essence. However, that concept is a homunculus fallacy. If our true self is inside looking out, then how does THAT inner person perceive the world but with another person inside his head looking out? Furthermore, where is the information stored that constitutes the memories, thoughts and sense of self that would allow us to recognize loved ones in heaven or cavort with virgins after martyrdom? If those things may be carried with you after death, then they must exist in some nonmaterial form... which would obviate the need for a brain at all and allow any other animal the same capacity for thought (indeed many religions profess reincarnation of the soul as any animal). A whole industry of belief thus arises from that single illusory perception of self that turns out to be a problem of infinite regress. I think, therefore I am... and nothing more.

Though I was all set to back away from the crazy dude at table 5 asking why objective facts are any better at informing us than belief, it appears that Jason is applying a similar premise called Ryle's Regress: basically that the ancestor of every action is a thought— a cause and effect process of reason. In other words, if we believe X is true because Y is true, and we believe Y is true because Z is true, then he's wants to know what the end result is, where that "ultimate truth" lies. However human behavior and reason don't work that way (or indeed it would lead to a situation of infinite regress). As Kant explained: "Of reason one cannot say that before the state in which it determines the power of choice, another state precedes in which this state itself is determined. For since reason itself is not an appearance and is not subject at all to any conditions of sensibility, no temporal sequence takes place in it even as to its causality, and thus the dynamical law of nature, which determines the temporal sequence according to rules, cannot be applied to it." In other words, human reasoning "needs no prior explanation for any of its choices or volitions." We may think X is true because Y is true, and we believe Y is true because Z is true, but at some point our beliefs are satisfied and we don't seek further support- that bottom turtle that must support the whole stack.

So one may think gay marriage is wrong, and it's wrong because it will harm traditional marriage, and it will harm traditional marriage because, um... the support didn't go that far. OK, but gay marriage is wrong because it harms our children, and it harms our children because... uh, oh... one more brick missing from the foundation. That was the Prop 8 trial in a nutshell. The value of objective facts as that they allow us to examine beliefs for real support and see whether they have a rational basis.
 03/23/2011 01:30:33 PM · #787
Originally posted by Matthew:
Originally posted by DrAchoo:
Still finding turtles on my way down...


Just skip to the bottom - cogito ergo sum and nothing more.

Not a fruitful line of enquiry - in order to have a sensible conversation I think that you probably have to accept some assumptions (e.g. we live in a universe and our senses convey information accurately within a broadly understood degree of tolerance).


I don't need to go all the way down there. :) I was pointing out the fallacy of Shannon's argument.

He says that his subjective moral opinions are based on objective facts while someone like myself has subjective moral opinions not based on objective facts. (Objective being an epistemologic term rather than meaning "unbiased".) I counter by saying that a subjective opinion is a subjective opinion. If the objective facts compel us to hold the moral position, then the moral position is deductively an objective fact. If the objective facts do not compel us to hold the moral position, then the position is subjective and implies that other subjective opinions can be reached (even rationally).

To further damn his case, his assertion that "opinion with a rational basis trumps irrational belief" is in itself a subjective opinion (and not objective fact). The framework itself is not internally consistent.

"Opinions based on objective facts are better than those that are not" is self-defeating as it is not an objective fact (and thus other statments are superior). It's a bit like Wile E Coyote running off the cliff edge. The system works until you realize you are standing on air. Really, the Moral Fictionalist says they realize they are standing on air but are doing so by choice.

Message edited by author 2011-03-23 13:48:47.
 03/23/2011 02:17:25 PM · #788
Originally posted by DrAchoo:
He says that his subjective moral opinions are based on objective facts while someone like myself has subjective moral opinions not based on objective facts.

Where did I say that? ALL opinions, moral or otherwise, are subjective (that's what makes them opinions). What I said is that we should consider the objective facts underlying an opinion rather than assuming the opinion itself true, and that merely declaring something right or wrong doesn't make it a fact. "Now, there may be very valid reasons for that opinion, but being inherently right or wrong isn't one of them."

Originally posted by DrAchoo:
To further damn his case, his assertion that "opinion with a rational basis trumps irrational belief" is in itself a subjective opinion (and not objective fact). The framework itself is not internally consistent.

[backs away again from the crazy dude who thinks facts aren't better suited to inform than belief...]
 03/23/2011 02:23:24 PM · #789
Originally posted by DrAchoo:
I don't need to go all the way down there. :) I was pointing out the fallacy of Shannon's argument.


I think that if you accept that our senses are broadly reliable, then you can start building facts that are reasonably objective.

However, you can never objectively assess whether something is morally correct - it is an intangible that is always a subjective assessment based on many balancing factors. These will always be given different weight by different people.

Your argument (AFAIK) is that there is one correct morality (in your case, determined by god), and that human nature tends towards it (hence broad consensus).

The same fact pattern could lead to the conclusion that human nature tends to generate similar responses in similar circumstances (hence broad consensus, or the wisdom of crowds).

Your argument does not take into account the fact that morality appears to change over time. Nor that some people take a very different view on what is moral (even within groups of Christians with apparently aligned moral direction).

Your argument can only survive these criticisms if you posit that morality is very general and broad brushed - but that doesn't really sit well with the concept of a single directing and judging mind (which implies a very specific morality), nor with the infinite variety of morally challenging circumstances that a broad brush simply can't cope with.

Example:

Theft is morally wrong.

But what about if it is someone stealing bread?

What if this was because their children have nothing to eat?

What if this was because the mother was workshy?

What if this was because her parents beat her?

What if she genuinely intended to pay for it when she could?

What if this drove the shopkeeper to bankruptcy?

etc etc - every facet of a situation can change our moral approach to it.
 03/23/2011 04:11:32 PM · #790
I think that is a worthwhile conversation Matthew, but wasn't what we were discussing. I am not saying that cognitivism doesn't have issues (if it didn't nobody would be a non-cognitivist), but non-cognitivism (ie. moral error theory, ie. moral fictionalism) has different very difficult flaws. I have been on the offensive and ripping that framework down rather than defending my own. The challenge began with Shannon asking for an objective moral truth. Originally this was understood by the audience to mean "objectively unbiased" or not dependent on the culture at hand. I offered the statement "Sometimes stealing is wrong." as being universally agreed upon by all cultures in history. A few refutations were brought up (like pirates) but none of them stuck (pirates don't steal from other pirates). Then the conversation shifted to an epistemologic "objective" which is a whole different ball of wax, and agreeably a more difficult proposition.

Moral fictionalism, however, is the most disingenuous of all because it purports to understand that moral statement are all in error and that morality as a whole is fictitious but chooses to use them because they are beneficial. Have cake. Eat too.

So it's important to discern between your possible position (subjectivism) and Shannon's (Moral Fictionalism). They sound the same when we talk to both of you, but Shannon, when pressed, is required to say it's all a nonsensical fiction.

Message edited by author 2011-03-23 16:24:31.
 03/23/2011 04:24:19 PM · #791
Originally posted by DrAchoo:
The challenge began with Shannon asking for an objective moral truth. Originally this was understood by the audience to mean "objectively unbiased" or not dependent on the culture at hand. I offered the statement "Sometimes stealing is wrong." as being universally agreed upon by all cultures in history. A few refutations were brought up (like pirates) but none of them stuck (pirates don't steal from other pirates). Then the conversation shifted to an epistemologic "objective" which is a whole different ball of wax, and agreeably a more difficult proposition.

It's the same ball of wax. Objectively correct (your claim) must be the epistemologic "objective," or it becomes subject to change and interpretation thereby rendering the claim itself irrelevant. You can't say that "slavery is acceptable" is an objective truth just because virtually everyone agrees at one point, and then turn around and say "slavery is wrong" is objectively correct because virtually everyone agrees at a different point. Your stealing example doesn't even hold without historical comparison because it's a fallacy of overwhelming exception in practice: "Stealing is wrong... except when you're a pirate, except when you're starving, except when someone has stolen from you, except when the target is an outgroup, except, except, except, except...
 03/23/2011 05:04:39 PM · #792
Originally posted by scalvert:
Originally posted by DrAchoo:
The challenge began with Shannon asking for an objective moral truth. Originally this was understood by the audience to mean "objectively unbiased" or not dependent on the culture at hand. I offered the statement "Sometimes stealing is wrong." as being universally agreed upon by all cultures in history. A few refutations were brought up (like pirates) but none of them stuck (pirates don't steal from other pirates). Then the conversation shifted to an epistemologic "objective" which is a whole different ball of wax, and agreeably a more difficult proposition.

It's the same ball of wax. Objectively correct (your claim) must be the epistemologic "objective," or it becomes subject to change and interpretation thereby rendering the claim itself irrelevant. You can't say that "slavery is acceptable" is an objective truth just because virtually everyone agrees at one point, and then turn around and say "slavery is wrong" is objectively correct because virtually everyone agrees at a different point. Your stealing example doesn't even hold without historical comparison because it's a fallacy of overwhelming exception in practice: "Stealing is wrong... except when you're a pirate, except when you're starving, except when someone has stolen from you, except when the target is an outgroup, except, except, except, except...


Which is, of course, why the statement is "Sometimes stealing is wrong" not "Stealing is wrong". Nobody ever says "stealing is always right." Nobody.

And while you can't say "stavery is wrong" because everybody disagrees with it and "slavery is right" because everybody agrees with it. You CAN slavery is wrong and the people who think otherwise are mistaken. OR you could say slavery is right and the people who disagree with it are mistaken. Both statements are internally consistent.

Message edited by author 2011-03-23 17:05:32.
 03/23/2011 05:19:07 PM · #793
I think some of the disagreement and confusion deals with the word "true" or "truth". Let's take the following example:

"If you capture your opponent's king, you win in chess."

How do we classify this statement? Is it true? And if so, is it "objectively true"? Can the word "truth" (or "true") mean something different in certain circumstances?
 03/23/2011 05:20:02 PM · #794
Originally posted by Matthew:
However, you can never objectively assess whether something is morally correct - it is an intangible that is always a subjective assessment based on many balancing factors. These will always be given different weight by different people.


Okay, as an atheist, skeptic and confirmed subjectivist, I am going to take the contrary stand. Morality can be both subjective and subject to objective analysis. This makes no sense, you say! Actually, it does, but it requires the acceptance of one assumption: respect for individual autonomy is a moral positive.

This should be an uncontroversial assumption* – if one does not accept that individual autonomy is to be valued, then there can be no personal argument against any detrimental action to oneself by an outside party.

In other words, if any individual desires for their own autonomy to be valued and respected, then they are intrinsically accepting the principle that individual autonomy is to be valued generally, even if they do not always act in ways that honors their own internalized belief. (Further, while one might hypothetically posit the existence of a mentally competent person who does not accept this base assumption – an individual that has no stake in others respecting their own personal autonomy – such a position is logically and practicably incoherent.)

Once accepted, this base assumption provides a method by which morality can be seen as entirely subjective (the product of derived social norms), but also open to objective critique – actions that do not violate the base assumption are favored (“moral”); actions that violate the principal that individual autonomy should be valued are disfavored (“immoral”).

For example, under this framework in a hypothetical society of 10 individuals, any decision arrived at by the consensus of, and that only effects, those 10 persons, will be moral. Obviously, total consensus is practicably unachievable in any society of any appreciable size. However, this does not mean that the principle is not still meaningfully applicable for objectively evaluating individual and social actions.

"Moral societies" will be those that act to maximize the meaningful participation of that society’s individuals in that society's process of creation of social norms. Thus, under this framework, democratic society’s can be said to be objectively more moral than totalitarian societies, for example, because the nature of a totalitarian regime is to restrict or curtail the individual autonomy of its citizenry.

Similarly, social/governmental actions or policies that maximize the participative power of individual citizens - e.g., policies that promote education, political participation, civil rights, etc. - can be said to be more moral that those actions and policies that undermine or curtail citizens' participatory power - e.g., denying individuals/populations voting power, institutionalized race/class/gender distinctions, etc. Thus, you can objectively say that Jim Crow was an objectively immoral social policy, because it restricted the ability of Blacks to participate as full citizens within their communities.

Finally, on the level of individual action, this framework permits you to say that certain personal behaviors are immoral when those behaviors act contrary to respect for other's personal autonomy. So, for example, murder is clearly immoral as it is the ultimate breach of the base assumption.

Note that theft is not clearly moral or immoral in this framework without more information as to the specifics of the theft. Theft from those in abundance to feed those in need may actually be moral (or at least morally allowable), while theft from those already in need or of particular resources may be immoral. This does not prevent the society from saying, for purely practical, utilitarian reasons, that theft is "wrong" and should be discouraged, but things that are wrong will not always be immoral.

* Should be uncontroversial, but certainly is in some philosophical circles, including, I have no doubt, right here in this forum. Don't agree, fine. If you want to tell me that I'm wrong, you must first explain to me how any valuation of morality can be had without an acceptance of the base assumption of the value of respect for personal autonomy.

edited for clarity

Message edited by author 2011-03-23 17:49:08.
 03/23/2011 05:25:59 PM · #795
Originally posted by DrAchoo:
"If you capture your opponent's king, you win in chess."

I don't think that's "true." You win at chess by placing your opponent's king in immediate jeopardy with no possible escape, but the piece is never actually captured.
 03/23/2011 05:32:12 PM · #796
Originally posted by GeneralE:
Originally posted by DrAchoo:
"If you capture your opponent's king, you win in chess."

I don't think that's "true." You win at chess by placing your opponent's king in immediate jeopardy with no possible escape, but the piece is never actually captured.


Paul, you magnificent Bastard! I actually knew this, but I was just trying to be simple. Stop confusing things with facts! You know what I mean... :)
 03/23/2011 05:36:33 PM · #797
Originally posted by DrAchoo:
Originally posted by scalvert:
Objectively correct (your claim) must be the epistemologic "objective," or it becomes subject to change and interpretation thereby rendering the claim itself irrelevant.

You CAN slavery is wrong and the people who think otherwise are mistaken. OR you could say slavery is right and the people who disagree with it are mistaken.

Sure, and that very principle makes the claim totally irrelevant/meaningless/useless/worthless as guidance. If I say the sky is blue and people who think otherwise are mistaken and you say the sky is chartreuse and people who think otherwise are mistaken, then how does that inform anyone of anything they don't already believe? It doesn't. You have to turn to examination of facts/truths/things that actually CAN be correct or incorrect to weigh the validity of the argument. Whichever claim holds up then pretends that their moral truth was in fact correct, even though it was just a happy accident that their views happened to match the prevailing attitudes of the group.
 03/23/2011 05:46:21 PM · #798
Expanding more on the hypothetical society of 10, set out above, note that even decisions that act to curtail the autonomy of one or more of the 10 will be objectively moral, IF the decision is unanimously arrived at AND all of the 10 individuals had the same available information on which to base their vote.

So, for example, if all 10 believe that by throwing one of the 10 in a volcano they will prevent the volcano from erupting and killing the other 9, a unanimous vote to take action that will result in one of the 10 being thrown in the volcano is objectively moral.

But also note that the decision must be unanimous and all ten must have an equal vote and access to the same information. 9 of the 10 cannot morally vote to throw the remaining 1 into the volcano. Similarly, if #1 through #9 just don't like #10 and come up with scheme to convince #10 that throwing #10 in the volcano is the way to prevent eruptions, even if #10 selflessly votes with the other 9 to toss himself in, the act is still immoral, because #10 does not have access to the same information as the rest of the group.
 03/23/2011 05:47:18 PM · #799
Originally posted by shutterpuppy:
Actually, it does, but it requires the acceptance of one assumption: respect for individual autonomy is a moral positive.


Sadly much like the dictum "It is immoral to steal (sometimes)" autonomy as a moral positive is great, until it meets another autonomy. Howard Roark, Ayn Rand's hero from The Fountainhead Fully expresses a certain style of autonomy when he blows up buildings he designed because others had interfered with his design. His autonomy took precedence over that of others, the "second handers" like all the people who actually worked to make the buildings he blew up. If autonomy is the great good, how can we interact when our needs come into conflict?

"The right to swing my fist ends where the other man's nose begins."
-- Oliver Wendell Holmes
 03/23/2011 05:47:52 PM · #800
Originally posted by DrAchoo:
Originally posted by GeneralE:
Originally posted by DrAchoo:
"If you capture your opponent's king, you win in chess."

I don't think that's "true." You win at chess by placing your opponent's king in immediate jeopardy with no possible escape, but the piece is never actually captured.


Paul, you magnificent Bastard! I actually knew this, but I was just trying to be simple. Stop confusing things with facts! You know what I mean... :)


But, doesn't the opponent have to surrender?...and wouldn't that mean he was captured?
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